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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the role of religious law in constitutionalism by 
focusing on Egypt and Tunisia as two main case studies: Egypt is an example 
of the so-called “Islamic constitutionalism” and Tunisia is an example of a 
more secular variety. Both cases are analyzed against the backdrop of U.S. 
constitutional theory and law. I begin by rejecting conceptualist approaches 
which focus on abstract concepts in order to assess the compatibility of 
religion, like Islam, with democracy. I show the futility of this kind of debate 
through a comparison to American debates between “living constitutionalists” 
and “originalists.” I then elaborate a pragmatic account that assesses the 
consequences of different institutional arrangements. For that purpose Part I 
rejects the normative and political-realist arguments supporting the 
constitutionalization of religion, according to which constitutionalization of 
religion in a largely-liberal constitution is either an ideal compromise or a 
historical dictate. I focus on four assumptions that underlie these arguments: 
that popular acceptance requires Islamic constitutionalism; that people’s 
identity includes religious law and should be reflected in Islamic 
constitutionalism; that Islamic law’s indeterminacy belittles the possible risks 
of its constitutionalization; and that the legal order’s transparency requires an 
acknowledgment of the religious aspect. 
Part II considers two of the primary arguments supporting the U.S. 
Establishment Clause: alienation; political division and distraction; and 
corruption of religion. The first two arguments have been subjected to growing 
critiques in the United States. I defend these two arguments by connecting 
between alienation and internal effects within religious minorities, and 
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between political division and instability and violence. Specifically, I argue 
that, first, the constitutionalization of religion is likely to produce an unequal 
status for religious groups given the pluralist conditions in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Second, constitutionalization is likely to polarize and destabilize the political 
system in these states. Finally, this polarization happens for the wrong reasons 
and may produce bad effects: the dominance of the debate over the 
constitutionalization of religion may distract the citizenry in these states from 
addressing other socio-economic and political questions that are not 
necessarily reduced to concerns over religious law; constitutionalization is an 
anti-participatory move because it empowers few jurists to make decisions 
rather than collective decision-making; delegating controversial religious 
questions to the judiciary is a form of secular escapism; and a 
constitutionalization of religion is part of a constitutional fetishism which—
along with judicial empowerment—unduly legalizes political questions. The 
implication of these effects is to neglect political responsibility. Thus, the 
Article ends with a call for a Weberian consequences-driven ethics of 
responsibility. This ethical stance, in turn, should be part and parcel of the 
recognition of value pluralism and the attempt to transform politics into an 
adversarial “agonistic pluralism.” 
By displacing the conceptualist debate, the Article seeks to avoid the 
generalizing tendency of conceptual debates; evade the unwarranted optimism 
of the normative argument; and reject the realist argument’s despondency and 
uncritical acceptance of reality. Additionally, the Article seeks to demystify 
Islamic constitutionalism by grounding the discussion in American 
constitutional debates. Finally, the Article argues against Islamic 
constitutionalism without falling prey to essentialism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the 2010 to 2011 uprisings, the Arab world has been in flux. The role 
of religion in politics and constitution-making, in particular, took center stage. 
The previously banned Islamist movements achieved impressive results in the 
electoral processes that followed the uprisings—except in Libya—and gained 
influential positions in the emerging political and constitutional order in 
Tunisia and Egypt.1 However, these movements’ rule encountered fierce 
opposition from state institutions and secular political forces. In Tunisia, the 
opposition demanded the dismissal of the Al-Nahda-led coalition government 
and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly after the assassination to two 
prominent opposition leaders.2 In Egypt, the opposition expressed growing 
concerns regarding the increasing role of religion and religious parties in state 
institutions and in the constitutional order and opposed the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s exclusive approach to governance.3 On June 30, 2013 mass 
protests erupted against Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rule.4 On July 3, the army ousted President Morsi, installed a 
temporary president and a civilian government, and suspended the December 
2012 Constitution that Morsi’s regime ratified.5 On August 14, 2013, Egyptian 
security forces used lethal and excessive force to break pro-Morsi sit-ins and 
killed hundreds of protesters.6 Following these events, Islamists attacked 
Coptic churches across Egypt.7 Once again, two years after the uprising and 
 
 1 See infra Part I.A. 
 2 Carlotta Gall, Liberal Opposition Leader is Assassinated in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A4; 
Carlotta Gall, Protesters Gather as Slain Tunisian Politician is Buried, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2013, at 12.  
 3 See, e.g., Khaled Fahmy, ‘We Did Not Risk Our Lives Simply to Change the Players’, CNN (July 3, 
2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/opinion/egypt-morsy-khaled-fahmy.  
 4 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi’s Ouster, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A1.  
 5 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Army Ousts Morsi, Suspends Charter, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2013, 
at A1; Abigail Hauslohner, William Booth & Sharaf al-Hourani, Egypt’s Military Ousts Morsi, WASH. POST, 
July 3, 2013, at A1.  
 6 David D. Kirkpatrick, Hundreds of Egyptians Killed in Government Raids; Emergency Declared as 
Sectarian Violence Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, at A1; Egypt: Security Forces Used Excessive Lethal 
Force: Worst Mass Unlawful Killings in Country’s Modern History, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force; Amnesty Int’l, 
Egypt’s Disastrous Bloodshed Requires Urgent Impartial Investigation (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.amnesty. 
org/en/news/egypt-s-disastrous-bloodshed-requires-urgent-impartial-investigations-2013-08-16.  
 7 Hamza Hendawi, Egypt: Islamists Hit Christian Churches, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18, 2013, 
available at LEXIS, International News.  
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one year after rising to power, the Muslim Brotherhood faced calls for banning 
it from political participation.8 
What does the brief rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt teach 
us about constitutional law and comparative constitutionalism? What 
implications will it have for the role of religion in the post-Arab Spring 
constitutional order? Despite many uncertainties, one fact should be clear: 
Morsi’s ouster is not a clear secular move against religious zealots. After all, 
the Salafis—who are generally perceived as more religiously extreme than the 
Muslim Brotherhood—supported the ouster and participated in the post-Morsi 
transition.9 Prior to February 2011, Salafis generally theorized against 
democratic regimes and refused to participate in electoral and party politics.10 
Yet, they participated in the nascent post-Mubarak political order and struck a 
partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood.11 Leaving the Brotherhood’s sinking 
ship after June 30, they guaranteed retaining the controversial and most 
religious clauses of the 2012 Constitution in Interim-President Adly Mansour’s 
constitutional declaration on July 8, 2013.12 
The tumultuous relationship between religion, politics, and 
constitutionalism is the subject of this Article. In particular, this Article 
discusses and comparatively evaluates the question of “Islamic 
constitutionalism” against the backdrop of American constitutional theory and 
American debates on religion and constitutionalism. By Islamic 
 
 8 Crispian Balmer & Yasmine Saleh, Muslim Brotherhood Faces Ban as Egypt Rulers Pile on Pressure, 
REUTERS, August 17, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/17/us-egypt-protests-id 
USBRE97C09A20130817; Gamal Essam El-Din, Technical Committee to Propose Radical Changes to 
Egypt’s 2012 Constitution, AHRAM ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2013), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/ 
79368/Egypt/Politics-/Technical-committee-to-propose-radical-changes-to-.aspx; David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Egyptian Court Shuts Down the Muslim Brotherhood and Seizes Its Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 24, 2013, at A4.  
 9 See Patrick Kingsley, Egypt’s Salafist al-Nour Party Wields New Influence on Post-Morsi Coalition, 
GUARDIAN (July 7, 2013, 1:37 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/07/egypt-salafist-al-nour-
party.  
 10 See Ammar Ahmad Fayed, Al-Salafiyyon fi Misr: Min Shar’aeyyat al-Fatwa ila Shar’aeyyat al-
Intikhab [Salafists in Egypt: From the Legitimacy of the Fatwa to Electoral Legitimacy], Al Jazeera Ctr. Stud. 
(2012), for a discussion of Salafism in Egypt. See Fabio Merone & Francesco Cavatorta, Salafist Mouvance 
and Sheikh-ism in the Tunisian Democratic Transition (Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Dublin City Univ., Working 
Paper in Int’l Studies No. 2012-7, 2012), for a discussion of Salafism in Tunisia.  
 11 Kingsley, supra note 9. 
 12 Compare CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 8 July, 2013, art. 1 
(“The principles of Islamic Sharia, which include its overall evidences and jurisprudence rules and established 
sources in the Sunni canons, is the main source of legislation.”) with CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC 
OF EGYPT, December, 2012, art. 2 and art. 219; see also Nouran El-Behairy, President Ratifies Constitutional 
Declaration, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (July 9, 2013), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/09/president-
ratifies-constitutional-declaration/. 
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constitutionalism, I mean the constitutionalization of religious law in a largely-
liberal constitution through empowering constitutional court judges to review 
the validity of laws on the grounds of their compatibility with Islamic law. As 
a case study, this Article focuses on Egypt and Tunisia whose histories present 
different models of the relationship between religion and constitutionalism and 
whose post-Arab Spring constitution-making processes have followed a 
different trajectory. 
In recent decades, both judicial review and Islamic law became part of the 
constitutional order in Arab constitutions.13 Many Arab and Islamic states 
designate Shari’a as “a source,” “a primary source,” or “the primary source” 
for legislation against which the validity of ordinary legislation may possibly 
be reviewed.14 The Iraqi Constitution of 2005, for instance, states that “Islam is 
the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation. No 
law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.”15 The 
dramatic political changes in Egypt and Tunisia provide rare opportunities for 
constitution-making in which previously excluded social and political groups 
can participate. It can be an occasion for reconsidering essential questions like 
the design of the political system and the role of religion in the constitutional 
order. Yet, constitution-making processes in deeply divided societies and under 
conditions of political instability are not moments devoid of partisan politics.16 
The Islamist Egyptian drafters of the 2012 Constitution chose to retain the 
model of Islamic constitutionalism and followed in the footsteps of the 1971 
Constitution, as amended in 1980, whose Article 2 designates Islam as the 
state’s official religion and stipulates that the “Principles of Islamic Sharia are 
the principal source of legislation.”17 Moreover, the drafters of the 2012 
Constitution—and the abovementioned July 8, 2013 Constitutional 
Declaration—sought to increase the religiosity of the draft compared to 
previous Egyptian constitutions.18 However, pre-Arab Spring Tunisia did not 
 
 13 NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE 
PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 143–45, 161–65 (2002).  
 14 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127, 
138–39 (1987).  
 15 Article 2, Section 1, Subsection A, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of 
Iraq] of 2005.  
 16 See, e.g., David Landau, Constitution Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA.. L. REV. 923, 980 (2013) (arguing 
that constitution-making processes should not be idealized).  
 17 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 2, 30 Nov. 2012; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.  
 18 David D. Kirkpatrick, A Vague Role for Religion in Egyptian Draft Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2012, at A4. 
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follow the model of Islamic constitutionalism but rather a more secular path.19 
Unlike the Egyptian constitution makers, Tunisians—as we shall see below—
chose not to include shari’a as a source for legislation even though Islam 
remains the official state religion.20 
A. Overview of the Argument 
Subparts B and C of this Introduction provide a brief background to the 
discussion that follows. Subpart B shows the different trajectories that 
Egyptian and Tunisian constitutionalism have followed vis-à-vis religion and 
provides a context for these differences. The theory of this Article is based on 
differentiating between two modes of argumentation—a conceptualist and a 
pragmatic—for the assessment of Islamic constitutionalism. Subpart C argues 
that the conceptualist debate is futile given the contestability of the basic 
concepts on which it is based. To illustrate this contestability, this Article 
shows the similarity of the methodological commitments of the main sides of 
the debate to the American debates between originalists and living 
constitutionalists. The rest of the Article develops a pragmatic account of 
debate. 
The pragmatic and consequentialist framework developed in this Article 
rests on two prongs. The first prong, developed in Part I, focuses on and rejects 
some of the main arguments supporting Islamic constitutionalism. This Article 
divides these arguments into normative and political-realist arguments. 
According to the normative argument, Islamic constitutionalism is a desirable 
ideal compromise between popular sentiment and securing rights. According to 
the political-realist argument, Islamic constitutionalism is undesirable but is 
the only workable outcome given the historical circumstances. To examine the 
validity of these arguments, this Article focuses on four underlying 
assumptions: (1) that popular acceptance requires Islamic constitutionalism; 
(2) that people’s identity includes religious law and should be reflected in 
Islamic constitutionalism; (3) that Islamic law’s indeterminacy belittles the 
possible risks of its constitutionalization; and (4) that the legal order’s 
transparency requires an acknowledgment of the religious aspect. By drawing 
on American debates, this Article questions these assumptions and argues that 
 
 19 Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law: Party Favors Unity Over 
Religious Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2012, at A10. 
 20 Article 1, Dustur al-Jumhuriyya al-Tunisiyya [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic] of 2014; Fahim, 
supra note 19, at 10. 
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both the normative and political-realist arguments fail to establish the case for 
a Shari’a clause. 
The second prong of the Article’s framework is developed in Part II which 
argues against Islamic constitutionalism given normative and prudential 
considerations. American debates on the Establishment Clause have generally 
focused on three primary arguments: (1) political division; (2) alienation; and 
(3) corrupting religion.21 According to the political division argument 
associated with Chief Justice Burger, state involvement in religious programs 
is potentially divisive on religious lines and may distract the citizenry from 
other issues.22 The alienation argument associated with Justice O’Connor, 
stipulates that state’s establishment of religion alienates part of the citizenry on 
religious lines and excludes them from the political community.23 According to 
the corruption argument associated with theorists like John Locke, Thomas 
Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, state establishment of religion is 
damaging and corrupting to religion itself.24 
The political division and alienation arguments are under attack. American 
scholars like Andrew Koppelman argue that alienation and division are 
inevitable; that alienation and division are ubiquitous and there is no reason to 
single out alienation and division on religious grounds; and that constitutional 
measures cannot prevent alienation and division and in fact may cause 
alienation and division themselves.25 This Article contributes to these debates 
by defending the alienation and division arguments through a comparative and 
relatively-thick descriptive account of post-Arab Spring Egypt and Tunisia. 
These political-realist critiques (“life is unfair, get over it!”) of the alienation 
and division arguments fail. First, alienation and division are not products of 
binary situations, such as alienation/no-alienation and division/no-division. If 
one perceives alienation and division as inevitable, then one is right to reject an 
ideal happily-ever-after scenario in which they do not exist. However, the 
alienation and division arguments do not presuppose or even aim at such an 
ideal, messianic scenario. If one understands that there is a wide 
 
 21 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009) (discussing these three arguments and arguing that the corruption of religion 
argument is comparatively superior to the other arguments); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND 
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 2 (2009) (arguing that a “religious left” perspective is superior to both the “secular 
left” and the “religious right,” and listing reasons for supporting the Establishment Clause).  
 22 Koppelman, supra note 21, at 1838–39. 
 23 Id. at 1839–41. 
 24 Id. at 1841–42.  
 25 Id. at 1841. 
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spectrum/continuum of situations of alienation and division, then some forms 
of alienation and division—presumably those that are more potentially 
destructive to the social fabric and the stability of the political system—can 
possibly be prevented and/or ameliorated. The discussion of the Coptic 
minority in Egypt in this Article26 shows that alienation is not merely an 
emotional or psychological or symbolic condition but is potentially 
institutionally consequential and disempowering for members of the religious 
minority vis-à-vis the recognized and established religious institutions. This 
discussion of Egypt illustrates some of the violent manifestations of 
polarization along religious lines. Egypt, in this sense, is a cautionary tale to 
the United States and elsewhere. 
Second, the ubiquity of alienation and division on various grounds, such as 
race and gender, is not a compelling reason for the lack of action regarding any 
of them. Whether there is something especially bad about religious-based 
alienation and division that would justify singling it out for special 
constitutional treatment is a contextual inquiry. The phenomenon of religious 
revival in various parts of the world including the United States and the 
forceful introduction of religion to the public sphere requires considering the 
potential divisiveness of religious questions.27 
Third, constitutional measures may not prevent religious-based alienation 
and political division but they may do so occasionally. The fact that they do 
not prevent them completely and all the time is not an argument for withering 
away these measures completely.28 Indeed, the existence of unpunished 
criminals is not a convincing argument for annulling criminal law. Moreover, 
the existence or non-existence of legal or constitutional measures addressing 
the role of religion is a regulatory choice: Lack of regulation is a form of 
regulation.29 Categories like religion or race are socially constructed and the 
law is complicit in this construction.30 
In this light, this Article argues in Part II that it is preferable to reject 
Islamic constitutionalism because it is more likely to produce bad effects than 
 
 26 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 27 See infra notes 397–403. 
 28 See, e.g., S. E. FINER, VERNON BOGDANOR & BERNARD RUDDEN, COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 1–5 
(1995). 
 29 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 327 
(1991). 
 30 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney-López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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the lack of religious law in the constitution. Specifically, it argues that, first, 
the constitutionalization of religion is likely to produce an unequal status for 
religious groups given the pluralist conditions in Egypt and Tunisia. Second, 
constitutionalization is likely to polarize and destabilize the political system in 
these states and a judicial involvement might lead to backlash. Finally, this 
polarization happens for the wrong reasons and may produce bad effects: (1) 
The dominance of the debate over the constitutionalization of religion may 
distract the citizenry in these states from addressing other socio-economic and 
political questions that are not necessarily reduced to or dictated by concerns 
over religious law; (2) it is anti-participatory because it empowers the few to 
make decisions rather than collective decision-making; (3) delegating 
controversial religious questions to the judiciary is a form of secular escapism; 
and (4) the constitutionalization of religion is part and parcel of a constitutional 
fetishism which—along with judicial empowerment—unduly legalizes 
political questions. 
As the implication of these effects and arrangements is to neglect and evade 
political responsibility, Part II concludes this consequences-oriented analysis 
by calling for a Weberian consequences-driven ethics of responsibility. 
Discarding the conceptualist debate and advancing a pragmatic debate may not 
make the debate less intractable, but it is more likely to make it better informed 
and lead to a better understanding of the stakes. Constitution-makers in states 
like Egypt and Tunisia have to take responsibility for their choices and these 
choices should aim at designing constitutional and political orders that are 
more conducive to human flourishing and for preventing suffering. For the 
ethics of responsibility to be conducive to these goals it needs to be part and 
parcel of the recognition of value pluralism—the irreducibility of value 
conflict—and the transformation of political practice from one based on 
enemy/friend antagonism to an adversarial “agonistic pluralism.”31 
Ultimately, this Article seeks to demystify the debate on Islamic 
constitutionalism by grounding it in debates in American constitutional theory 
and law. It is also a critique of exceptionalism that scholars grant to “Islamic 
constitutionalism” and “constitutional theocracies,”32 as opposed to debates on 
the Establishment Clause. American scholars who support the Establishment 
Clause in the United States make a variety of arguments for the establishment 
 
 31 See generally, CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX (2000). 
 32 See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010); Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic 
Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85 
(2009), for theories that focus on Islamic-majority states. 
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of religion elsewhere.33 This Article shows that there is no reason for such 
discrimination. Indeed, the term “constitutional theocracy” is misleading 
because it fails to give an adequate account of the constitutional and political 
practice of Islamic-majority states and obscures the commonalities between 
these states and arrangements in Christian-majority states.34 
B. A Brief History of Religion and Constitutionalism in Egypt and Tunisia 
1. Egypt 
To evaluate whether post-Arab Spring constitutional documents are more 
religious than their predecessors—as it is commonly argued with respect to the 
2012 Egyptian constitution—one needs to examine the previous Constitutions. 
The following brief review shows that the short-lived 2012 Egyptian 
Constitution only partially revises the relationship between religion and 
constitutionalism in Egypt. It is true that under Morsi’s rule many 
objectionable religious and conservative manifestations proliferated in the 
public sphere and parliamentary debates such as debates on whether to 
discontinue parliamentary sessions during the call for prayer; easing the 
marriage for minor girls; public praise for female genital mutilation; or the law 
sanctioning the closure of businesses at 10:00 PM in order to conduce 
compliance with the dawn prayer.35 Yet, as far as the Constitution is 
 
 33 Compare NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE 
SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 15–16 (2006) (defending the American separation that he considers to be “in sharp 
contrast to the arrangements of established churches in the [U.S.] framers’ Christian Europe or today’s Islamic 
world.”), with NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY (2003) 
[hereinafter FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD], and NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008) 
[hereinafter FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE]. 
 34 See, e.g., H. E. Chehabi, Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?, 120 
DÆDALUS, no. 3, 1991, at 69. Chehabi argues that the theocratic project in Iran was only superficially 
successful and it eventually failed after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. Id. at 87. For him, “religion and politics 
did not merge. Instead, politics became more religious and religion became politicized.” Id. at 78; see also 
Yasuyuki Matsunaga, The Secularization of a Faqih-Headed Revolutionary Islamic State of Iran: Its 
Mechanisms, Processes, and Prospects, 29 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE E. 468 (2009) (affirming the 
argument that the attempt to Islamize Iran through a religious jurist-led rule under Khomeini has advanced 
secularization in Iran by making sacred law more contemporary and worldly and by differentiating between 
politics and religion).  
 35 Jalal Amin, Daleel Al-Muslim Alhazeen (The Sad Muslim Manual), AL-SHOROUK (July 20, 2013), 
http://shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=20072013&id=063a00d1-5957-4c0a-bef6-2bacbe461635 
(listing these and other examples); see also Dan Murphy, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Says UN proposal on 
Women Will Destroy the World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Backchannels/2013/0314/Egypt-s-Muslim-Brotherhood-says-UN-proposal-on-women-will-destroy-the-world 
(discussing the Muslim Brothehood’s vehement objections to the recommendations that the Commission on 
the Status of Women submitted to the United Nations). 
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concerned, the change is quite limited, despite the exclusive control of the 
Islamists on the constitution-making process leading to the December 2012 
draft.36 
The main constitutional document in Egyptian constitutional history that 
established Islam as the state’s official religion is the 1923 Constitution, which 
was approved by King Fouad I under British colonialism.37 This constitution 
lasted till 1952, with a brief hiatus between 1930–1935, when the Free Officers 
revolted against King Farouk leading towards the independence from the 
British.38 Article 149 under the section “general principles” states that “Islam 
is the state’s religion and Arabic its language.”39 This article will be repeated 
verbatim in all the following constitutions, except in the short-lived 
constitution of 1958 to 1962 of the unity between Egypt and Syria under 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule.40 Other constitutions during Nasser’s 
era—1956 and 1964—included this sentence. The difference is that it moved 
from the closing sections of the 1923 Constitution to the opening section:41 
Article 5 in the 1964 Constitution under the section “the state,”42 and Article 3 
in the 1956 Constitution under the section “The Egyptian State.”43 It should be 
noted that an article making Islam the official state religion is quite common in 
Arab constitutions, even in so-called “secular states” like Tunisia under 
President Habib Bourguiba.44 
Nevertheless, the statement of official religion is declarative and formal 
and is legally and constitutionally meaningless without the tools and policies to 
apply it and make it effective and consequential. In fact, Arab constitutions are 
often referred to as constitutions without constitutionalism, or 
“nonconstitutional constitutions,” indicating the lack of implementation and 
 
 36 Kirkpatrick, supra note 18. 
 37 James Feuille, Note, Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy?, 47 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 237, 239–40 (2013).  
 38 Id.  
 39 Rescrit Royal No. 42 de 1923 établissant le Régime Constitutionnel de l´Etat Egyptien (Establishing 
the Constitutional Regime of the Egyptian State), Journal officiel du gouvernement égyptien, 19 Apr. 1923, 
art. 149 (Egypt) (“L’Islam est la religion de l´Etat; l´arabe est sa languo officielle.”).  
 40 See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 5 Mar. 1958 (Egypt) (omitting the 
provision regarding Islam as the religion of the state and Arabic as the language of the state).  
 41 MOHAMED CHERIEF BASSIOUNI & MOHAMED HELAL, AL-JOMHORIYYA AL-THANEYAH FI MISR [THE 
SECOND REPUBLIC IN EGYPT] 263 (2012), available at http://shorouknews.com/sites/republicII/ (noting the 
change in positioning the religion article in Egyptian constitutions).  
 42 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 1964, art. 5  
 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 16 Jan. 1956, art. 2.  
 44 See Mayer, supra note 14, at 135–38. 
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constraints on state power to guarantee citizens’ rights.45 Indeed, the effect of 
constitutions is quite limited and is related to the dominant political culture, the 
efficacy of the political system, and social processes.46 Nevertheless, limited 
effect does not mean lack of effect. One of the ways to turn “Islam is the state 
religion” into reality appeared during President Anwar Sadat’s rule.47 The 1971 
Constitution—a constitution that survived in most of its form until early 2011 
uprising—included Article 2, which stated for the first time, that “the 
principles of Islamic shari’a are a principal source of legislation.”48 Sadat 
included this sentence for two main reasons: First, Islamism rose in Egypt 
especially after Egypt’s defeat in its 1967 war with Israel.49 Second, Sadat 
wanted a different source of legitimacy than Nasser—who was a socialist in 
his orientation and implemented far-reaching redistributive schemes—and he 
called himself the “pious president.”50 In 1980, Sadat amended this Article to 
become “the principles of Islamic shari’a are the principal source of 
legislation.”51 The change from “a principal source” to “the principal source” 
is supposed to signal a greater emphasis on religious identity and compliance. 
The reason for this change is the increasing growth of Islamism and religiosity 
after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the increasing criticisms of Sadat after 
he signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1979, which led to Egypt’s 
isolation in the Arab and Islamic world.52 
Yet, again, “a principal source of legislation” is meaningless without tools 
for applying it. Changing the text to the “the principal” does not change this 
fact. The application mechanism emerged in 1979 with the establishment of 
the Supreme Constitutional Court, which has the power to review the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations, including whether they comply with 
 
 45 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 13, at 10–13.  
 46 Id. at 11–13. 
 47 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, art. 2, amended by May 22, 1980, 
May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.  
 48 Id.  
 49 BASSIOUNI & HELAL, supra note 41, at 252 (mentioning Sadat’s attempt to rehabilitate the regime after 
the 1967 defeat inter alia through introducing a constitution).  
 50 See id. at 253; Islam and the State Under Sadat, ISLAMOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.islamopediaonline. 
org/country-profile/egypt/islam-and-nation-building/islam-and-state-under-sadat.  
 51 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, May 22, 1980, art. 2, amended May 25, 2005, 
March 26, 2007.  
 52 Mayer, supra note 14, at 138 (“Egypt, by a 1980 referendum, changed its Constitution to make the 
shari’a “the main source” of legislation, rather than “a main source” of legislation . . . to placate Islamic 
fundamentalist critics of the Sadat government.”). 
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the principles of Islamic shari’a.53 The reasons for establishing the Court 
include the Sadat regime’s desire to encourage domestic and foreign 
investment in Egypt given the dire economic conditions after the War of 
Attrition with Israel.54 For that purpose, Sadat wanted to convince investors 
that he differs from Nasser and will not nationalize or confiscate their property 
and investments.55 The Court then was supposed to assure the investors that 
there is a mechanism for protecting property and economic rights.56 Indeed, 
within time the Court reversed many of Nasser’s socialist reforms and became 
a stronghold for economic liberalism and a defender of private property.57 
However, as far as Article 2 is concerned, the Court emptied it from 
content and made it a mere parchment barrier. It rejected Islamist attempts to 
activate this article in ways that would annul legislation. For that purpose, the 
Court limited Article 2’s applicability by stipulating that it cannot be applied 
retroactively on legislation that predated Article 2; and it interpreted principles 
to mean only those that are non-controversial and unambiguous.58 Thus, it 
seems that Article 2 may be non-consequential if regime-appointed and non-
religious judges apply it. In this context, Iraq presents a similar case.59 Thus, a 
problematic article in the 2012 Constitution—and the July 8, 2013 
constitutional declaration—is Article 4, which empowers Al-Azhar—a 
respected religious institution of learning—as a supreme authority on 
interpreting shari’a by granting it a consultative status.60 Yet, it is not clear 
from the text when this consultative role applies and how it will coexist with 
the Court’s interpretive power. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to 
ignore this article when it negotiated a loan with the International Monetary 
 
 53 Law No. 48 of 1979 (Law on the Supreme Constitutional Court), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 9 June 1979, 
art. 25, amended by Law No. 168 of 1998 (Egypt); Supreme Constitutional Court, ST. INFO. SERV., http:// 
www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=250# (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) http://www. 
sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=250# (last visited Apr. 2, 2014). 
 54 Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 LAW. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 883, 889–90 (2003).  
 55 See Feuille, supra note 37, at 241–42. 
 56 See Moustafa, supra note 54, at 890.  
 57 Id. at 908–13; see also Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three 
Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1825–26 (2004). 
 58 BASSIOUNI & HELAL, supra note 41, at 265–68. 
 59 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the Iraqi Constitution, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 692 (2010). 
 60 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 8 July, 2013, art. 29 (Egypt). 
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Fund, whereas the Salafis sought to activate it in order to prevent the loan on 
grounds of violating shari’a prohibitions on charging interests on loans.61 
Another article that relates to religion in the 2012 Constitution is Article 
219, which sought to define the interpretative reference materials of traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence included within the principles of shari’a.62 An article like 
Article 219 is likely to influence the modes of argumentation about shari’a.63 
This article was a reaction to the abovementioned Supreme Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence.64 It was a compensation for the Salafis who sought to 
change Article 2 into a more restrictive language.65 It sought to limit the 
discretion of the judges and their ability to manipulate shari’a materials.66 
However, such an attempt is often doomed to failure because it is based on a 
false distinction between the judicial function (applying the law) and the 
political function (lawmaking). Judges do not merely apply the Constitution, 
they have to interpret what it means and requires prior to applying it. Judges 
will still have discretion to interpret and apply the materials no matter how 
clear constitutional drafters seek their language to be.67 It would not 
necessarily dictate specific outcomes given the diversity of the sources and 
scholarly disagreements. These allow for gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities 
that will have to be filled by judicial legislation. In any event, the Constitution 
ratified in 2014 removes Article 219.68 
Another noteworthy article in the now-suspended constitution is Article 10, 
which stipulated that the family is a basic unit of society and that it is founded 
 
 61 Tom Perry, Egypt Islamists Say Clerics Must Approve IMF Loan, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2013, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-egypt-islamists-imf-idUSBRE91B1DA20130212.  
 62 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 219; Clark Lombardi & 
Nathan J. Brown, Islam in Egypt’s New Constitution, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 13, 2012), http://mideastafrica. 
foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/islam_in_egypts_new_constitution.. 
 63 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 62. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id.  
 67  Subpart C of the Introduction below analogizes the debate on Islamic constitutionalism to the debate 
between U.S. originalists and living constitutionalists. In the United States, the ascendance of originalism has 
led some progressive scholars to adopt and provide a progressive version of it by seeking to bridge the gap 
between living constitutionalism and originalism and claiming that progressive goals are consistent with 
original intent or public meaning. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–6, 16–20 (2011). Additionally, 
originalism can be abused and manipulated with respect to religious questions. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, 
Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 727–30 (2009). Therefore, the 
attempt in Article 219 to force the judges to utilize medieval sources does not necessarily lead to conservative 
outcomes.  
 68 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, February 2014. 
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on religion, morals, and patriotism.69 It also stipulated that the state will 
guarantee the conformity of women’s duties towards its family and her 
employment.70 This article is surely patriarchal but it is not novel: It is very 
similar to Article 7 of Nasser’s 1964 Constitution71 and Article 9 of Sadat’s 
1971 Constitution.72 Comparatively, it is also similar to Article 41 of the Irish 
Constitution73 and Article 7 of the Tunisian Draft Constitution of June 2013.74 
Moreover, Article 11 of the 1971 Constitution conditions gender equality on 
compliance with the rules (ahkam) of Islamic shari’a.75 The 2012 Constitution 
does not include such a clause.76 Thus, the Islamization of the political and 
constitutional order began with President Sadat rather than with Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This also cautions us against the binary simplifications 
according to which the Arab world has been divided between Islamists and 
secular autocrats.77 I will discuss the dangers of binary divisions amongst 
reified identities in Part II below. 
2. Tunisia 
Tunisia is the birthplace of Arab constitutions.78 The first Constitution in 
the Arab world was drafted there in 1861.79 The main constitution in Tunisia, 
however, is the post-independence Constitution of 1959,80 which survived until 
the December 2010 uprising. Although the Ataturkist Turkish model 
influenced President Habib Bourguibah, he did not follow that model by 
 
 69 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 
2005, March 26, 2007, art. 10.  
 70 Id. 
 71 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 1964, art. 7. 
 72 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 
25, 2005, March 26, 2007, art. 9. 
 73 IR. CONST., 1937 , art. 41. 
 74 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, art. 7. 
 75 See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, ch. 2, art. 11. 
 76 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012 .  
 77 Mayer, supra note 14, at 147. Mayer writes: “Another indication that many countries of the Muslim 
Middle East are not secular states is that they have constitutional provisions indicating that the shari’a is either 
‘a source’ or ‘the source’ of legislation.” Id. at 138. 
 78 BROWN, supra note 13, at 3.  
 79 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 26 Apr. 1861. The British colonizers abolished the short-
lived 1882 Egyptian constitution. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 7 Feb. 1882; Brown, 
supra note 13, at 16–20, 26–29. 
 80 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 1959. 
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declaring the state secular in the Constitution.81 Unlike the Turks, he did not 
relegate religion to the private sphere and create a wall between religion and 
state law and politics.82 Instead, the 1959 Constitution stipulates in Article 1: 
“Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state. Islam is its religion, Arabic 
is its language.”83 Malika Zeghal explains that President Bourgiba believed, 
first, that modernizing society requires a gradual approach; second, that 
modernization should include modernizing religion itself through state control 
and regulation; and third, that the state should develop an emotional 
attachment in the hearts of its citizens and for that purpose it should use 
religion.84 This shows that declaring an official state religion may endanger 
religion by putting it at the state’s mercy and does not always indicate a 
theocracy in which religion controls the state (even in Iran).85 
Zeghal recalls the change in President Bourguiba’s position regarding 
women’s Islamic dress code: In 1929, at the time of the struggle against French 
colonialism, Bourguiba defended hijab as a resistance tool against French 
colonization.86 This position is reminiscent of other nationalist and anti-
colonial movements: Partha Chatterjee shows how anti-British Hindu 
nationalism perceived women and specifically mothers as the carrier for 
national identity and values.87 Yet, after independence Bourguiba’s position 
changed.88 However, he legally banned hijab only in 1981 after the growth of 
Islamist influence in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution.89 
 
 81 See Malika Zeghal, Public Institutions of Religious Education in Egypt and Tunisia: Contrasting the 
Post-Colonial Reforms of Al-Azhar and the Zaytuna, in TRAJECTORIES OF EDUCATION IN THE ARAB WORLD 
111, 112 (Osama Abi-Mershed ed., 2010). 
 82 Id. 
 83 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 1959, art. 1. 
 84 See Malika Zeghal, Veiling and Unveiling Muslim Women: State Coercion, Islam, and the ‘Disciplines 
of the Heart’, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF BELIEF: REFLECTIONS ON THE THOUGHT OF MOHAMMED ARKOUN 127 
(Abdou-Filali-Ansary & Aziz Esmail eds., 2012). 
 85 Chehabi, supra note 34, at 78-81. Chehabi argues that although religion was politicized in Iran, that 
did not create an institutionalized Church-like hierarchy—especially given the opposition of traditional clergy 
to their inclusion in the bureaucratic theocratization—. Id. at 81-84. After the passing away of Khomeini the 
separation became clear between political and religious authority given the failure to formalize charismatic 
leadership. Id. at 84-87.  
 86 Zeghal, supra note 84, at 127, 129–30.  
 87 PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 
116 (1993). 
 88 Zeghal, supra note 84, at 130. 
 89 Id. at 137. 
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Bourguiba had also a different conception of modernization from Egypt’s 
President Nasser.90 The former marginalized the clerics class, dried up their 
financial revenue, and closed Al-Zaytuna—the main institute for religious 
learning—turning it into a mere course of study in secular universities.91 
Nasser followed a different path with Al-Azhar: He retained it as an institution 
but internally modernized it by including non-religious subjects in the 
curriculum.92 Zeghal explains this difference by Nasser’s need for Al-Azhar’s 
prestige to enlist it in his regional politics against Saudi Arabia, and the need 
for the institution to absorb the huge numbers of students in Egypt.93 Yet, 
Nasser’s reforms and control of Al-Azhar in the 1960s paved the way for Al-
Azhar’s advent in the 1970s and 1980s as a political player.94 By the 1990s Al-
Azhar would become an influential institution given President Mubarak’s need 
for the legitimacy stamp in his fight against extremist Islamist groups.95 
Modernization, then, “did not produce secularization.”96 
The Tunisian trajectory explains, in part, the choices that Tunisian 
constitution makers made in the June 2013 draft of the constitution. The 
Islamists—in this case Al-Nahda party—are torn between enhancing religion’s 
role in the public sphere and their fear of state’s control of religion given their 
experience prior to the Arab Spring.97 The draft retains the phrase, “Tunisia is 
an independent state whose religion is Islam,” and simultaneously declares that 
“Tunisia is a civil (madaniyya) state, based on citizenship, people’s will, and 
supremacy of law.”98 The draft also makes the state the protector of religion, 
the guarantor of freedom of belief and neutrality of places of worship so they 
are not used by political parties, and the protector of the sacred (Article 6).99 A 
 
 90 Zeghal, supra note 81, at 115–16. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 116; see also LEONARD BINDER, ISLAMIC LIBERALISM: A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT 
IDEOLOGIES 80 (1988).  
 94 Malika Zeghal, Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State 
(1952–94), 31 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 371, 372 (1999) (“Far from having had a negative effect on the 
ulema’s political vitality, the modernizing process radically transformed their political identity because it 
inadvertently offered them a political forum as well as a basis for the expansion of their educational 
institution.”). 
 95 Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in 
Contemporary Egypt, 32 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 12 (2000). 
 96 Zeghal, supra note 94, at 396. 
 97 See Malika Zeghal, Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian 
Transition, 20 CONSTELLATIONS 254, 261 (2013). 
 98 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, arts. 1, 2. 
 99 Id. art. 6. 
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previous draft included the phrase “[the state] criminalizes all attacks on the 
sacred” which raised concerns regarding freedom of speech.100 The June 2013 
draft drops the word “criminalization” and vaguely speaks of “protecting the 
sacred.”101 Article 73 excludes non-Muslims from eligibility to the president’s 
position by stating that the candidate must be a Muslim.102 As we will discuss 
below, Al-Nahda initially attempted to add a clause similar to the Egyptian 
Article 2 but the secularist opposition made Al-Nahda change its position.103 
The Tunisian assembly ratified the Constitution on January 26, 2014, which 
did not include such an article. It is clear that—unlike the Egyptians—the 
Tunisians did not rush into ratifying a controversial document in a highly 
controversial process.104 
C. From Conceptualism to Pragmatism 
The first step in this Article’s analytical framework is to distinguish 
between two major modes of argumentation about Islamic constitutionalism: 
conceptualist and pragmatic. The conceptualist analysis is overly concerned 
with determining the debate by analyzing abstract concepts.105 This has been 
the dominant mode of argumentation thus far; the debate has been concerned 
with the question whether Islam and democracy are compatible.106 In order to 
assess this conceptualist debate, I map the different positions. There are two 
primary groups of discourse: unity and disunity. For unity scholars, Islam and 
democracy are compatible,107 whereas the disunity scholars find them 
 
 100 Tunisia: Fix Serious Flaws in Draft Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/13/tunisia-fix-serious-flaws-draft-constitution.  
 101 DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 1 June 2013, art. 6. 
 102 This article existed in previous drafts and was criticized by human rights groups. See, Tunisia: Revise 
the Draft Constitution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 13, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/13/tunisia-
revise-draft-constitution. In the final ratified version in 2014 the article’s number is 74. CONSTITUTION OF THE 
TUNISIAN REPUBLIC, 27 January 2014, art. 74.  
 103 See infra Part II.B. 
 104 This does not imply that the constitution-making process has been flawless. See, e.g., CARTER CTR., 
THE CARTER CENTER ENCOURAGES INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TUNISIA’S 
CONSTITUTION DRAFTING PROCESS; CALLS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT 
ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODY (May 11, 2012), http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/tunisia-
statement-051112-en.pdf.  
 105 Nimer Sultany, Against Conceptualism: Islamic Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in the 
Aftermath of the Arab Spring, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 435, 439 (2013).  
 106 Id. at 439–46 (developing the argument in greater detail). 
 107 The literature attempting to reconcile between Islamic law and democracy, or discussing efforts of 
scholars and constitutional courts reconciling Islamic law and democracy, is vast. See e.g., MUHAMMAD ABED 
AL-JABRI, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2009); MUHAMMAD ABED AL-
JABRI, AL-DIMOKRATIYYA WA HOQOOQ AL-INSAN [DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS] (1994) (Arabic); 
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incompatible and cannot be united in a political regime.108 Disunity scholars 
follow two primary opposite moves: Salafis reject democracy as incompatible 
with Islam.109 Secularists—as in the Turkish Constitutional Court—reject 
Islam as incompatible with democracy.110 Salafis insist on divine sovereignty, 
 
KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY (2004); KHALED ABOU EL FADL ET. 
AL., THE PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN ISLAM (2002); FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD, supra note 33; FELDMAN, THE FALL 
AND RISE, supra note 33; ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR AN 
OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS (2009); FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE: A FEMINIST 
INTERPRETATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Mary Jo Lakeland trans., 1991); ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, 
THE ISLAMIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM (2007); Mohammad Fadel, The True, the Good and the 
Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law, 21, 30–42 CANADIAN J. L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 5 (2008); Mohammad H. Fadel, Public Reason as a Strategy for Principled Reconciliation: 
The Case of Islamic Law and International Human Rights, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008); Mohammad H. Fadel, 
Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655, 695–700 (2008); 
Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic and American Constitutional Law: Borrowing Possibilities or a History of 
Borrowing?, 1 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 492 (1999); Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions 
Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles 
Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 389–94 (2006); Bruce K. Rutherford, 
What Do Egypt’s Islamists Want? Moderate Islam and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism, 60 MIDDLE E.J. 
707, 726–31 (2006); Kristen Stilt, “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2011). 
 108 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence 
of Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2010), for a disunity scholar who is neither a Salafist 
nor a secularist. See ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF 
SHARI’A (2008); see also Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
3 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 4 (2005) (claiming that Islamic constitutionalism is inherently undemocratic). 
For a Christian equivalent to An-Na’im’s faith-based argument for separating state from religion see: DARRYL 
HART, A SECULAR FAITH: WHY CHRISTIANITY FAVORS THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2006). See 
infra notes 109–110 (discussing Salafist and secularist approaches). 
 109 Democracy Is Heresy, Says Salafi Nour Party, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM (Egypt) (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/540666. For more on Salafism, see generally Henri Lauzière, The 
Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism From the Perspective of Conceptual History, 42 INT’L J. 
MIDDLE E. STUD. 369 (2010); Scott S. Reese, Salafi Transformations: Aden and the Changing Voices of 
Religious Reform in the Interwar Indian Ocean, 44 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 71 (2012); Joas Wagemakers, 
The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Wal ’Wala 
Wa-L-Bar ’Bara, 44 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 93 (2012).  
 110 See, e.g., GEORGE TARABISHI, HARTAKAT; ‘AN AL-DIMOKRATIYYA WAL ‘ALMANIYYA WAL 
MOMAN’AH AL-’ARABIYYA [HERESIES: ON DEMOCRACY, SECULARISM, MODERNITY, AND ARAB 
INTRANSIGENCE] (2006) (Arabic); GEORGE TARABISHI, HARTAKAT 2: ‘AN AL-’ALMANIYYA KA ISHKALIYYA 
ISLAMIYYA-ISLAMIYYA [HERESIES 2: ON SECULARISM AS AN ISLAMIC-ISLAMIC PREDICAMENT] (2008) 
(Arabic). See Ceren Belge, Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 653 (2006); Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of 
Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in Modem Turkey, 105 W. Va. L. Rev. 53 (2002); Hootan 
Shambayati & Esen Kirdi , In Pursuit of “Contemporary Civilization”: Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 
Pol. Res. Q. 767 (2009); Mehmet Cengiz Uzun, The Protection of Laicism in Turkey and the Turkish 
Constitutional Court: The Example of the Prohibition on the Use of the Islamic Veil in Higher Education, 28 
Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 383 (2010), for the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court; . 
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secularists insist on popular sovereignty, and moderate reconcilers insist on 
both.111 
This mapping shows the contestability of the competing conceptions of 
both Islam and democracy.112 Each one of the three main positions ignores 
contestability in a different way. Salafis do not reject democracy, if democracy 
means a simple-majoritarian system; rather, they reject liberal rights.113 On the 
other hand, secularists are not majoritarian democrats because they prioritize 
rights over democracy.114 
This contestability is also evident in the comparison of these debates to the 
American debates.115 After all, in both cases we have a group of scholars and 
judges offering different interpretations and applications of an old foundational 
and authoritative text.116 They compete over which interpretive method is 
legitimate and would lead to correct interpretations of the text. Salafis are 
originalists who advocate a literalist reading of the text and opinions of the 
pious forefathers.117 They are textualists who see the text as a self-contained 
unit. They claim that there is a clear-cut, determinate, and fixed meaning of the 
text.118 Moderate reconcilers, on the other hand, are like American scholars 
 
 111 See generally Sultany, supra note 105. 
 112 See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956), for a 
discussion of the meaning of essentially contested concepts. 
 113 Sultany, supra note 105. 
 114 See, e.g., Asli Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish 
Example, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 235 (2012) (arguing that judicial independence and invocations of 
constitutionalism have undermined democratization in Turkey and imposed an illiberal conception of 
secularism).  
 115 Sultany, supra note 105; Asifa Quraishi, Interpreting the Qur’an and the Constitution: Similarities in 
the Use of Text, Tradition, and Reason in Islamic and American Jurisprudence, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 67 
(2006).  
 116 The comparison is valid if one recalls the veneration with which many hold the U.S. Constitution. See, 
e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). One should also note the religious origins of modern constitutional ideas. See, e.g., 
GRAHAM HAMMIL, THE MOSAIC CONSTITUTION: POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND IMAGINATION FROM 
MACHIAVELLI TO MILTON (2012); MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010); JAMES Q. 
WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008) 
(religious origins of criminal law doctrines). Additionally, judges in supposedly secular states are not immune 
form religious influences. See, e.g., JAY ALAN SEKULOW, WITNESSING THEIR FAITH: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR OPINIONS (2006); Stephen M. Feldman, Empiricism, Religion, and 
Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43 (2006); George Kannar, The Constitutional 
Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).  
 117 Sultany, supra note 106. 
 118 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (espousing a textualist approach that focuses on the text rather than overarching principles 
and emphasizes the original meaning); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
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who advocate a dynamic or constructive interpretation or a living 
constitution.119 They emphasize the context, and highlight underlying 
principles. 
But despite the way Salafis and reconcilers represent themselves, their 
methodological commitments are similar.120 Both are textualists because they 
interpret the text; both are originalists because they claim fidelity to the text; 
and both are dynamic interpreters because Salafis construct the past from a 
modern perspective and their insistence on fixed meaning despite the changing 
context makes them arguably unfaithful to the text.121 If so, the similarity of 
the interpretive method shows that none of the parties have a better claim for 
greater legitimacy of their outcomes.122 
I conclude that the debate cannot be resolved on a highly abstract and 
conceptual manner. The concepts on which the debate is based are themselves 
unstable. Scholars are talking past each other when they deploy different 
conceptions of these concepts.123 I have found in American constitutional 
theory that there is no a priori way to stabilize the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy.124 Similarly, in the debate on Islamic 
constitutionalism I argue that there is no a priori way to stabilize the 
relationship between Islam and democracy. 
Therefore, instead of this conceptualism this Article seeks to advance a 
different kind of conversation that is based on a situated, pragmatic, and 
consequentialist-style analysis. The pragmatic analysis doubts the availability 
 
854 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution has “fixed meaning” and the Court should not interpret it in ways 
that conform to “current societal values”). 
 119 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005), for American constructive interpretive methods and 
living constitutionalism. 
 120 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1989) 
(arguing that there is no meaningful distinction between originalists and non-originalists). 
 121 SAMIRA HAJ, RECONFIGURING ISLAMIC TRADITION: REFORM, RATIONALITY AND MODERNITY (2009); 
see also Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (emphasizing the indeterminacy of the past and the need to reconstruct it based 
on contemporary preconceptions); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) 
(arguing that “fidelity” to the text does not necessarily mean unchanging interpretation of the text because 
interpretation includes meaning and context, and thus non-originalist, dynamic theories can be no less faithful 
to the text than originalism. On the other hand, strict originalism is not faithful to the text if it ignores the 
changing context). 
 122 Sultany, supra note 105, at 454. 
 123 Id. at 455-460. 
 124 Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional 
Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371 (2012). 
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of a priori solutions to value conflicts. It does not seek internal conceptual 
coherence; does not deploy deductive reasoning; and does not examine the 
compatibility of legal arrangements with ideal visions.125 Instead, it focuses on 
the consequences of alternative institutional structures or legal doctrines. These 
consequences are evaluated in accordance with normative and prudential 
considerations. Pragmatism should avoid the pitfalls of uncritical acceptance of 
that which is perceived as “common sense” in order to realize its critical and 
progressive potential: 
By permitting us to concentrate on the human dimension of law, 
pragmatism frees us from self-created obstacles to human progress 
and directs our attention to what really matters: doing away with so-
cial practices that create unnecessary human misery and promoting 
practices that nurture human flourishing.126 
Accordingly, the pragmatic case for or against Islamic constitutionalism should 
be made on normative and prudential grounds rather than through an abstract 
conceptual debate. Indeed, even if shari’a and democracy were incompatible in 
principle, there might still be prudential reasons for supporting Islamic 
constitutionalism.127 Alternatively, even if shari’a and democracy were 
compatible, there might be prudential reasons for not lending one’s support for 
a constitutional system in the form of Islamic constitutionalism. 
I. NORMATIVE AND PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS FOR ISLAMIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In this Part, I address normative and prudential arguments supporting 
Islamic constitutionalism and show why they fail. Broadly conceived, there are 
two main arguments for the constitutionalization of shari’a: a normative, 
idealistic argument and a political-realist, prudential argument. The normative 
argument maintains that the combination between shari’a and rights is an ideal 
compromise in the formation of the constitutional order. On the one hand, a 
constitution should reflect popular sentiment or the identity of the people. On 
the other hand, it should also secure rights to constrain majorities when they go 
astray. A constitution that contains both a shari’a clause and liberal rights (like 
equality and freedom of conscience) is the best answer to this situation. This 
 
 125 Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical 
and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (1990). 
 126 Id. at 1824.  
 127 See infra Part I. 
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argument, then, is optimistic regarding the consequences of the combination 
between the two elements in a unified structure. 
Unlike the normative argument, the political-realist argument does not 
normatively endorse a shari’a clause. The realist maintains that Islamic 
constitutionalism is not an ideal, or even a desirable arrangement, but this 
unfortunate necessary concession is dictated by our judgment regarding what is 
workable under concrete historical circumstances. This concession to illiberal 
forces is worthwhile because it achieves a concession from the Islamists as 
well to endorse liberal rights. It encourages internal debates and the search for 
common ground, and supports the moderates against the extremists. 
Additionally, the structure is indeterminate and thus manipulable in liberal 
directions. Hence, the concession may not be as bad as may be initially 
assumed. 
In what follows I would like to disaggregate these two arguments into four 
secondary assumptions. I will call these: the arguments from legitimation, 
identity, interpretive indeterminacy, and transparency. I argue that these two 
main arguments fall once one questions their supporting arguments and 
underlying assumptions. 
A. Legitimation by Popular Acceptance 
Here the argument is that the constitution should reflect popular sentiment 
in states like Egypt and Tunisia. Since this sentiment demands an Islamic 
constitution, the constitution should incorporate a shari’a clause. Such 
incorporation would legitimate the constitutional order by making it more 
likely for the general public to accept it. There are many difficulties with this 
argument: First, whether the people in Egypt or Tunisia want an Islamic 
constitution is not that evident. It depends on the chosen method for detecting 
popular will. This method is likely to be controversial. Second, even if one 
detected popular will, it is unclear why one should prioritize the synchronic 
perspective over the diachronic perspective. Third, even if one prioritizes the 
synchronic perspective that would not necessarily mean that the constitution is 
either normatively legitimate or will be stable over time. I explicate these 
points in what follows. 
1. Popular Will? 
It is unclear how supporters of this argument measure “what the people 
want.” Interestingly, the arguments supporting Islamic constitutionalism have 
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been propagated when Egypt, for instance, had no fair and free elections that 
can credibly assess majority wishes.128 The main pre-Arab Spring example that 
supporters of Islamic constitutionalism cite is the anticipated victory of the 
Islamists in the Algerian elections of 1992, which led to a bloody civil war 
after the army cancelled the elections.129 Yet, the notion of popular will is 
highly contested even in well-established constitutional democracies with fair 
elections. Each method to detect this will is contestable. Scholars question, for 
example, the ability of electoral systems and representative institutions to 
convey popular will.130 I will consider here post-Arab Spring electoral results 
and public opinion surveys. The point here is not to deny the democratic 
legitimacy of Islamist-led governments; rather it is only to problematize 
attempts to deduce from electoral results a clear support to a shari’a clause. 
The first Egyptian free elections after overthrowing President Muhammad 
Mubarak’s rule produced mixed results and do not show conclusive support for 
political Islamists. True, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Nour party 
performed impressively in the parliamentary elections. However, the voter 
turnout was only fifty-four percent of eligible voters.131 The first round of the 
presidential elections showed that political Islam does not necessarily have the 
majority of the votes. In the second round the Muslim Brotherhood candidate 
received 51.7% of the vote, and he received that only after liberal and left-wing 
parties sided with him against the candidate of the old regime, who rejected 
 
 128 FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD, supra note 33. 
 129 See, e.g., Editorial, Democracy Denied in Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A24. 
 130 Robert Dahl, for example, argues that the electoral system does not really translate majority’s wishes.  
The only important point to stress here is that in no large nation state can elections tell us much 
about the preferences of majorities and minorities, beyond the bare fact that among those who 
went to the polls a majority, plurality, or minority indicated their first choices for some particular 
candidate or group of candidates. What the first choices of this electoral majority are, beyond that 
for the particular candidates, it is almost impossible to say with much confidence.  
. . . .  
. . . We expect elections to reveal the “will” or preferences of a majority on a set of issues. This is 
one thing elections rarely do, except in an almost trivial fashion. 
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 129–131 (1956). See also Bruce A. Ackerman, The 
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1984); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1988); 
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 53-55 (1986) (critiquing representative democracy as insufficiently representative of the people). 
 131 Muslim Brotherhood Tops Egyptian Poll Results, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/middleeast/2012/01/2012121125958580264.html.  
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shari’a law.132 In other words, the 51.7% includes votes of those who reject 
political Islam. On the other hand, 48.3% of those who voted for the old 
regime were virtually entirely against the Brotherhood. 
The December 2012 referendum on the Egyptian constitution showed a 
63.8% majority support for the constitution. Meanwhile, 36.2% percent voted 
against it. Yet, many parties opposing the Muslim Brotherhood rule boycotted 
the referendum. Indeed, the 32.9% turnout was very low and can hardly show a 
compelling support on the Egyptians’ part for an Islamic constitution.133 
Similarly, the October 2011 elections in Tunisia after the overthrow of the 
former regime resulted in mixed results with Al-Nahda party gaining 41% of 
the vote and 90 out of 217 seats in parliament.134 These results forced Al-
Nahda to form a coalition with more liberal parties, such as The Congress 
Party of the Republic and Ettakattol. In addition, Islamist groups like Al-Nahda 
are internally divided on the question of incorporating shari’a in the 
constitution: 
The decision to avoid mentioning sharia in the constitution was taken 
by the party’s political council, its top deliberative body of about 120 
elected members. Of the 80 members who participated in the debate, 
only 12 voted in favor of shari’a. By contrast, a straw poll of En-
nahda members of parliament taken a few days earlier showed a 
small majority in favor of including sharia.135 
The ultimate decision to exclude shari’a from the constitution was based on 
several considerations: 
According to an [Al-Nahda] parliamentarian, the political council 
made the decision for a number of reasons. One is that the meaning 
of shari’a is varied and the council did not want to leave a vague ref-
erence in the preamble up to judicial or public (mis)interpretation. 
The question of shari’a is also not that important to the party when 
compared with other problems facing the country, such as a stable 
 
 132 David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at 
A1. Ahmed Shafiq, the old regime candidate, declared with respect to shari’a: “The application of [shari’a] law 
is complicated. . . . Civil law is the best choice for Egypt.” Where They Stand—Egyptian Candidates Shafiq 
and Mursi, BBC (June 6, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18296326.  
 133 Egypt’s Constitution Passes With 63.8 Percent Approval Rate, EGYPT INDEP. (Dec. 25, 2012), http:// 
www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-constitution-passes-638-percent-approval-rate.  
 134 Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda Party Wins Historic Poll, BBC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-africa-15487647.  
 135 Duncan Pickard, The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT (Apr. 
19, 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/current-status-of-constitution-making-in-tunisia. 
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and well-balanced government. [Al-Nahda] wanted to avoid contra-
dicting its preelection platform as well as to signal its determination 
to adopt the constitution by consensus—and the shari’a issue had 
emerged as a red line for the secular parties. And it wanted to demon-
strate to the world that including a reference to shari’a is not neces-
sary for establishing a democracy that is compatible with Islam.136 
Libya, on the other hand, is the only and first example in which Islamists did 
not win the election in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. A non-Islamist bloc 
emerged as the leading party in the first Libyan elections after the overthrow of 
Colonel Mu’ammar Qaddafi conducted in July 2012.137 Independents occupied 
the majority of the parliamentary seats.138 
Surveys of Arab public opinion show division over questions of religion 
and state. A 2011 comprehensive poll in twelve Arab countries, including 
Egypt and Tunisia, showed that forty-three percent of respondents supported 
separating religion from the state, whereas forty-two percent rejected that 
separation.139 While fifty-six percent would accept having a religious party in 
power, forty-five percent agreed with having a party that calls for separating 
religion from the state in power (two-thirds of Tunisians and fifty-six percent 
of Egyptians).140 Although eighty-five percent of the respondents said they 
were religious, a majority (sixty-six percent) said they were “somewhat 
religious.”141 Forty-seven percent said that religious practices are private and 
should be separated from social and political life, including sixty-three percent 
of Tunisians and fifty-five percent of Egyptians.142 And fifty-nine percent said 
that sheikhs (i.e. religious authorities) should not influence governmental 
decisions.143 In another survey, forty-four percent of Egyptians said they 
preferred that Egypt’s political system would look like Turkey’s.144 
 
 136 Id. 
 137 David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Results to Break an Islamist Wave, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1. 
 138 Wolfram Lacher, Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New 
Libya, 2013 SWP RES. PAPER (STIFTUNG WISSENSCHAFT UND POLITIK), no. 4, at 9. 
 139 ARAB CTR. FOR RESEARCH & POLICY STUDIES, THE PROJECT OF SURVEYING ARAB PUBLIC OPINION: 
ARAB SURVEY 2011, at 69 (2012), available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-
8bc5-fc91660608b0.http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0. 
 140 Id. at 42, 43 figs. 25, 26. 
 141 Id. at 61, 62 fig. 41. 
 142 Id. at 62, 63 fig. 42. 
 143 Id. at 68 fig. 46. 
 144 SHIBLEY TELHAMI, ANNUAL ARAB PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/events/2011/11/21%20arab%20public%20opinion/20111121_arab_public_opinion.  
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2. Synchronic vs. Diachronic 
Even if one found a non-controversial way to measure popular will, the 
question remains whether to favor the synchronic perspective over the 
diachronic. The argument “this is what the people want” relies too heavily on 
the synchronic perspective—what the people want now and over the short 
term—and completely ignores the diachronic perspective that acknowledges 
how these choices change over time. The former is a myopic view of the 
conditions in Egypt or other Arab or Islamic countries that paints nations with 
singular colors. Seyla Benhabib notes that external observers tend to see unity 
and uniformity in society whereas internal social agents tend to see the 
divisions and struggles.145 A pragmatic analysis should make room for critical 
engagement of social agents with their surroundings.146 Indeed, “what the 
people want” is an open question to which various actors inside Egypt or 
Tunisia give different answers. And “what the people want” is likely to change 
over time. Choices that constitution framers make regarding a shari’a clause 
are likely to influence developments over time.147 
The Tunisian example illustrates the preference to a diachronic perspective, 
and that an alternative institutional design is possible. The main party, Al-
Nahda, did not demand the introduction of shari’a into the constitution after the 
revolution. Al-Nahda’s leader agued that the Tunisian Salafis’ demand for such 
an introduction is a reaction to extreme secularism of the previous authoritarian 
regime, and suggested that the democratic process will tame these extremist 
demands over the long run.148 
The histories of European and North American secularism as well as 
Islamic history illustrate the importance of the diachronic perspective. It is not 
 
 145 SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA (2002).  
 146 Singer, supra note 125, at 1824. 
 147 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 313–14 (2008) (discussing 
path dependency).  
 148 Al-Asaad Ben Ahmad, We Fought for Freedom, Not Sharia Law, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Apr. 
5–11, 2012, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1092/re4.htm. Whether political participation leads to 
moderation and democratization of extremist parties like salafis is not clear, however. See, e.g., Steve L. 
Monroe, Salafis in Parliament: Democratic Attitudes and Party Politics in the Gulf, 66 MIDDLE E.J. 409, 410 
(2012) (“First, political participation does not inherently promote democratic attitudes. Despite operating for 
almost a decade in three parliamentary terms and competing in two competitive elections, Bahrain’s Al-Asalah 
has consistently obstructed democratic reform. Second, religious ideology does not necessarily define 
democratic attitudes; both blocs [in Bahrain and Kuwait] support the same literalist tendencies and the same 
broad objective of promoting Islamic governance, yet both espouse contradictory attitudes towards democratic 
governance in their respective states.”) (emphasis added). 
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that “what the people wanted” in European and North American countries was 
from the beginning a secular regime of separation between church and state. 
Rather, popular endorsement of institutional configurations was the outcome of 
a long—and, at times, bloody—conflict. Secular forces have not clearly 
triumphed in Europe and North America, and religion still plays an important 
role in politics and society, especially in the United States. As Nikki Keddie 
wrote, “[T]he West was at first no more open to secularization than are parts of 
the Middle East and South Asia today,” and “the common idea that religion 
and politics have always been more inextricably intertwined in Islam than 
Christianity is untrue.”149 It is ahistorical and essentialist, then, to argue in the 
case of Muslim societies that “this is what they want” as if this was a self-
evident argument. This is especially true given that “the historical Islamic 
tradition does not offer any definitive model of what the Church-State 
relationship should be—or even a model of a ‘Church’ in the Western 
sense.”150 Ann Elizabeth Mayer writes: 
There was no unitary, hierarchical structure like that of the Roman 
Catholic Church, and there was no Islamic institutional counterpart to 
the Papacy that could define orthodoxy for the entire community of 
believers—no institutional counterpart to the “Church”, in other 
words, that was capable of being “established” in the European sense. 
As indicated, the closest thing Islam had to a “Church’” was the 
“ulama” [clerics] class itself.151 
Hence, one would think a separation between religion and state should be 
theoretically no less acceptable in Islamic-majority states than in Christian-
majority states. Yet Noah Feldman argues that “secularism of the Western 
variety is not a necessary condition of democracy” in order to justify the lack 
of separation between religion and state under an “Islamic democracy.”152 This 
Article is not arguing that all states should follow the same blueprint. It is 
arguing, however, that first, the Arab present should be historicized because 
that would prevent the reification of the present. Second, Islamic practice is 
open to different forms of relationship between religion and state, and 
considering this openness, the Article questions the attempt to justify the lack 
of separation as if it were the only or the main available form. 
 
 149 Nikki R. Keddie, Secularism & Its Discontent, DÆDALUS, Summer 2003, at 14, 20–21.  
 150 Mayer, supra note 14, at 131; see Chehabi, supra note 34, at 69 (regarding the lack of church in Shiite 
Islam.) 
 151 Mayer, supra note 14, at 132–33. 
 152 See FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD, supra note 33, at 12. 
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3. Stability and Legitimacy 
Even if one chooses the synchronic perspective and rejects the diachronic 
perspective, that would not necessarily mean that the constitution would be 
more legitimate or stable over the long run. The argument is that the 
incorporation of shari’a in the constitution would stabilize the political systems 
in states like Egypt and Tunisia because the citizenry who are predominantly 
Muslim will accept it. This argument relies on a Weberian sociological account 
of legitimacy that prizes the fact of acceptance.153 But this is not the only or the 
best account of legitimacy. A normative conception of legitimacy would posit 
normative pre-conditions for assessing the legitimacy of legal-political 
ordering.154 It is true that majority support is crucial, but that is a question of 
stability over the long run rather than a question of legitimacy. It is futile to run 
away from such normative conditions because supporters of the popular 
acceptance thesis are also presupposing normative conditions—i.e. whether 
and when one accepts the fact of majority choices is a value-based question.155 
Furthermore, one cannot simply derive the “ought” from the “is.” It is a logical 
fallacy to infer from a descriptive statement (that majorities in Arab states 
support a shari’a clause) a normative conclusion (that a constitution ought to 
incorporate a shari’a clause).156 
Indeed, some popular choices may lead to stability, but whether that is 
legitimate or democratic is a different matter. Our judgment about the 
desirability of stability is a normative question that relates to our conceptions 
of legitimacy and democracy.157 In Egypt, the authoritarian leaders introduced 
 
 153 See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 31–38, 212–15 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans, 1978) (1968). 
 154 Nimer Sultany, The Poverty of Constitutional Theory: Justice, Legitimacy, and Legitimation 177–78 
(Apr. 2012) (unpublished S.J.D. Dissertation, 2012) (on file with the Harvard law School Library). 
 155 See Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 64, 83–85 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (arguing that coercion exists not only in the case of the 
legal ordering, but also in the sociological presuppositions that validate it, and concluding that participation in 
this coercion should also be justified).  
 156 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000).  
 157 But see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (2009). The authors claim that stability is inherent to the idea of a constitution; and that 
stability is a good thing because it provides a stable basis for politics, promotes obedience to the law, allows 
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of empirical approach of positive political science the authors adopt is flawed. It follows the rational choice 
model, which assumes that individuals are self-interested rational actors who have stable preferences—and 
want to maximize the good things—without examining the formation of these preferences. Id. at 7. The 
authors assume that stability is good and thus recommend ways to maximize stability of constitutions. Id. at 
88. Yet, there is a difficulty in comparing a large set of cases and only by formally comparing the documents 
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the shari’a clause as part of the attempt to legitimate their otherwise 
undemocratic and illegitimate rule.158 They aimed at consolidating their rule by 
negotiating with religious institutions, like al-Azhar, and empowering them in 
return for their support against the more radical Islamic groups.159 Mubarak’s 
and Tunisia’s Zine el Abedin Ben Ali’s authoritarian regimes were stable for 
three decades, and yet they can hardly be considered democratic or 
normatively legitimate. 
4. Short Constitutional Life Span? 
The lack of long-term durability itself may be used to justify the 
constitutionlization of shari’a, for it suggests that the stakes involved in 
incorporating shari’a are not that high if one recognizes the short life span of 
constitutions. Indeed, few constitutions are as old as the U.S. Constitution. One 
study suggests that the average life span of world constitutions is nineteen 
years.160 Egypt had several constitutions whose life span was not particularly 
long.161 Tunisia had an early and short-lived constitution (1861) and, after 
independence, had a constitution (1959) that outlived its Egyptian counterparts, 
surviving until the 2011 uprising.162 Despite the relatively short life span of 
many of these constitutions, this argument is merely speculative. There is no 
way before hand to ascertain whether the constitution will have a short or a 
long life span. The rapid changes in Egyptian constitutions reflect inter alia a 
history of colonialism, a revolution against the monarchy, a short-lived 
 
and their life span with scant attention to their history and politics. This comparative method ignores the 
difference between sham constitutions and democratic constitutions; it ignores the gap between flexibility in 
form but entrenchment in effect (as in the case of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in India), and 
ignores the gap between entrenchment in form and flexibility in effect. Amendments can occur in different 
ways even if the constitution is not formally amended through a change in the sociological understandings 
underpinning a constitutional order or judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISR. L. REV. 321, 325–28 (2011); see Frederick Schauer, Amending the 
Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). Finally, constitutions can endure also 
because they are ignored in practice. As in states of emergency—despite the increasing occurrence of 
“emergency” and despite the increasing constitutionalization of emergency—the constitutional provisions 
regulating states of emergency are not always invoked. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of 
the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 215 (2004). 
 158 BASSIOUNI & HELAL, supra note 41, at 263. 
 159 Islam and the State Under Mubarak, ISLAMOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.islamopediaonline.org/ 
country-profile/egypt/islam-and-nation-building/islam-and-state-under-sadat. 
 160 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 157, at 1–2.  
 161 See BROWN, supra note 13, at 36-41 (on Egyptian constitutional history). These constitutions include 
those that date from 1882, 1923, 1930, 1956, 1958, 1964, 1971, 2012. 
 162 Id. at 16-20 (on early Tunisian constitutionalism).  
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unification with Syria, and a popular uprising. The 1959 Tunisian 
Constitution’s endurance for half a century is above the nineteen years average 
and is not, relatively, a short time. A stable democratic regime with peaceful 
transitions and a flexible constitution might enjoy a longer life span, which is 
why risk-averse constitution makers who oppose the constitutionalization of 
shari’a may choose to exclude shari’a out of fear of durability. In addition, for 
one to evaluate the stakes involved one needs to know how the clause will be 
interpreted and applied. It may be ignored and hence become a mere 
parchment barrier. But if it were applied strictly and widely then it may have 
grave consequences even if it were only for two or three decades. 
B. Reflecting the People’s Identity 
It may be argued that a constitution should reflect the identity of the people, 
so in a predominantly Muslim state like Egypt or Tunisia, the constitution 
should be Islamic. One scholar writes: 
Muslim states have often incorporated Islamic law into their legal 
systems, in part, to offer a fixed source for their legal systems and, 
thereby, for their national identity. . . . Shari’a as [a] political symbol 
involves the use of historical rules to give substantive content to the 
political identity of the nation at both the domestic and international 
level.163 
Unlike the argument discussed in the previous Subpart, here the argument is 
that religious law is integral to the people’s identity in these states, whether 
synchronically or diachronically assessed. Thus, religious law is not a mere 
passing popular sentiment. 
1. The Effects of Identity Politics 
There is no dispute that domestic law forms identities, so the question 
becomes which forms should this legal construction of identities take.164 
Ironically, the attempt to entrench the Islamic majority’s identity might be 
rooted in a perception that the majority’s identity is under attack. That is, the 
majority in such a case would have a minority consciousness because it is often 
 
 163 Anver M. Emon, The Limits of Constitutionalism in the Muslim World: History and Identity in Islamic 
Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 258, 260 
(Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008) (footnotes omitted). See also HIRSCHL, supra note 32, at 3.  
 164 Clarissa Rile Hayward & Ron Watson, Identity and Political Theory, 33 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 9, 10 
(2010); see generally Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 97 (1991) (arguing that judges and 
lawyers construct their own identities when they construct and represent their clients’ identities). 
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the minority that seeks protection given its numerical inferiority and its limited 
effect on the political system. Accordingly, it may be argued that Islamic 
identity needs protection not given present conditions inside the state in 
question but rather given the global conditions of: (1) lack of political and 
economic autonomy of small and weak states;165 (2) the cultural hegemony of 
western and secular ideas that require the preservation of Islamic identity;166 
and (3) the rise in Islamophobia in Europe and North America.167 Curiously, 
such an argument shifts the discussion from one internal to the question of 
citizenship to external to it. Paradoxically, it complains about external 
vulnerability to justify internal distribution of rights. It is unclear, however, 
how internal arrangements like a shari’a clause would combat cultural 
hegemony or economic dependency on the world stage. And even if it did, it is 
not clear what added value will such a clause have when personal law 
arrangements are anyway based on religious law and when Islam is already 
recognized as the religion of the state. 
Crucially, the argument mistakes “identity politics” for “identity” and 
reduces the latter to the former, as the discussion in Subpart II.C below shows. 
Identity politics refers to demands for recognition, assertions of identity, and 
cultural expressions to counter the perceived devaluation or misrepresentation 
of that identity. As such it is distinct from the “politics of recognition” in 
which minority groups express demands to reverse structural injustices within 
 
 165 See Mayer, supra note 14, at 129. 
 166 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 14, at 127–30 (describing state Islamization programs as a reaction to 
westernization/modernization/secularization processes); see also World Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 
19–May 7, 1993, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 
(June 9, 1993). The preamble emphasizes the need to combat materialism and preserve Islamic identity: 
Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah . . . and the role that this 
Ummah should play to guide a humanity confused by competing trends and ideologies and to 
provide solutions to the chronic problems of this materialistic civilization. 
Wishing to contribute to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from ex-
ploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance 
with the Islamic Shari’ah.  
Convinced that mankind which has reached an advanced stage in materialistic science is still, and 
shall remain, in dire need of faith to support its civilization and of a self motivating force to guard 
its rights.  
Id.  
 167 See Org. of the Islamic Conference, Astana, Kazakhstan, June 28–30, 2011, Fourth OIC Observatory 
Report on Islamophobia: Intolerance and Discrimination Against Muslims, 38th Council of Foreign Ministers 
(2011) (claiming there has been a recent increase in discrimination toward Muslims in Europe and the United 
States).  
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unfair and unequal socio-political arrangements.168 The politics of recognition 
may be reduced to identity politics if it takes the form of “culturalism.”169 This 
reduction risks displacing redistributive arguments because it disconnects 
“economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and 
prestige.”170 It also ends up reifying the group’s identity because “it puts moral 
pressure on individual members to conform to a given group culture. . . . The 
overall effect is to impose a single, drastically simplified group-identity which 
denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their identifications 
and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations.”171 Even those who argue that 
all politics is identity politics and should not be idealized as a search for the 
common good, reject the “pathologies” of identity politics like essentialism, 
demonization, and victimhood.172 These pathologies produce similar effects to 
the reduction of the politics of recognition to identity claims. 
The reification effect is evident in this view of Islamic law as integral to 
people’s identity in post-colonial Arab states. This view overestimates the 
importance of Islamic law and ignores its hybridity by imagining an idealized 
authentic law grounded in medieval sources and is unaffected by historicity 
and uncontaminated by transplants from foreign law.173 
Giving Islamic law an overarching status analytically in our approach 
to law in the Islamic world, distorts our understanding of legal phe-
nomena in these countries. Islamic law should be approached as one, 
but only one, of the constitutive elements of law that has not only 
been de-centered by the transplant but also transformed. Not only 
have its rules been reformed, but also its modes of reasoning, and its 
jurist class. Its treatises have been turned into codes, and its qadis 
turned into modern judges. Moreover, its internal conceptual organi-
zation, has been transformed by being reduced to a rule structure pos-
 
 168 IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 102–07 (2000). 
 169 See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 111 (2000). 
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. at 112; see also Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of 
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115–16 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) 
(discussing the “coherentist” assumptions of identity politics); Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A 
Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38 (Wendy Brown & Janet 
Halley eds., 2002). Ford argues that cultural rights can be an imprisonment and not only protection, and that 
rights discourse is “too crude to deal with the complex policy questions generated by cultural pluralism.” Id. at 
61, 73. 
 172 See, e.g., Richard D. Parker, Five Theses on Identity Politics, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 56–57 
(2005). 
 173 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 307–11, 323–24 
(2010) (detailing the extensive borrowing from foreign law in Arab and Islamic legal systems). 
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itivized in a code and dependent on state enforcement. Consequently, 
its normative hold over people has changed.174 
Ignoring the hybridity of Islamic law is related to another mistake in 
conceptualizing Islamic law. The legal realists have pointed out the difference 
between law in the books and law in action and the folly of attempting to 
separate the law from its practice.175 Yet a large part of the scholarship on 
Islamic law ignores this insight by denying the law’s historicity.176 Amr 
Shalakany considers dominant Islamic legal historiography to be based on four 
faulty premises. First, it reduces Islamic law to shari’a (i.e. confining the object 
of inquiry to the exegesis of the sacred texts). Second, it cleanses shari’a from 
politics and custom (and hence the profane/secular is expelled from the domain 
of the sacred). Third, it overemphasizes the explanatory power of a simplistic, 
binary dichotomy between shari’a and politics (and hence divorcing legal 
theory from legal practice: rather than a unison of theory and practice it 
presupposes a contrast between theory and practice; rather than understanding 
legal practices as part of shari’a and its evolution, they are perceived as 
external to—and a violation of—shari’a). Fourth, it overemphasizes the 
explanatory power of a simplistic, binary dichotomy between tradition and 
modernity both under colonialism and in the post-colonial Arab state (i.e. the 
perceived need to “modernize” and “westernize” given the immutable nature 
of the “traditional” shari’a given the denial of its historicity).177 This 
commitment to what Shalakany calls a “scripturalist” form of legal 
historiography is evident in reformist scholarship that is critical of the classical 
orientalist writers on Islamic law because the reformists reproduce these 
binaries and do not stray far away from these premises.178 Likewise, the focus 
on judicial practice and the reality of constitution-making—as in Hamoudi’s 
work on Iraq—rather than on abstract theorizations on “constitutional 
theocracies,”179 reveals that the constitutionalization of shari’a serves an 
identitarian value rather than a controlling substantive legal arrangement.180 
 
 174 Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 
AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 823 (2004).  
 175 See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 176 Amr A. Shalakany, Islamic Legal Histories, 1 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 1, 29 (2008).  
 177 See id. at 9–27.  
 178 See id. at 59–67. 
 179 See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 422–38 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). Hirschl fails to mention any 
other legal document in Iran other than the constitution. In contrast to his discussion of the United States, 
Canada, Germany, Italy, France, and India, he does not mention a single judicial ruling in “strong 
establishment” states, like Iran, to justify his typology of constitutional regimes’ approaches to religion. Id. at 
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2. Identity and the Constitution 
In any event, this identity-based argument is unsuccessful given the 
contestability of the questions whether the constitution should reflect the 
people’s identity and how. First, there is no necessity in understanding the 
constitution as the locus for national identity and values.181 One may side with 
those scholars who see the constitution as primarily about procedural rules for 
a functioning government rather than about fundamental values and as the 
locus of national identity.182 This understanding seeks to limit the 
constitutional domain and rejects the necessity to couch all political and social 
questions in constitutional terms. This might be an attractive approach in cases 
in which there are deep divisions and violent encounters in identitarian 
aspects.183 It may be also more attractive in newly established democratic 
regimes—as opposed to more established and stable political orders—that have 
not reached a sufficient equilibrium.184 A modus vivendi agreement on the 
rules is likely to be easier than agreement on contested values, and is more 
meaningful than agreement on highly abstract (and hence empty) values. 
 
434–437. His focus on formal texts is also evident in distinguishing between cases like Ireland, which he 
includes within “Formal Separation with De Facto pre-eminence of One Denomination,” and Egypt, which he 
includes within “Strong Establishment” or constitutional theocracies. Id. at 430–31, 435–37. Although Ireland 
does not have an Article 2-like text, Catholicism influences its constitutional jurisprudence. See infra note 187. 
On the other hand, although Egypt has this Article in the text it has been judicially interpreted very elastically. 
Mayer, supra note 14, at 131. It is also unclear why Hirschl distinguishes between Israel, which he includes 
within “Religious Jurisdictional Enclaves,” and Egypt. Hirschl, supra, at 433–35. Israel endorses one 
monotheistic religion and declares itself as Jewish and democratic, (which echoes the claims that so-called 
“constitutional theocracies” like Egypt are, or can be, Islamic and Democratic). See, e.g., Michael M. 
Karayanni, The Separate Nature of the Religious Accommodations for the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 
5 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 41 (2006).Finally, although Hirschl argues against the simplistic dichotomy between 
a secular West and a religious others, he ends up having only Islamic-majority states in the constitutional 
theocracy model. Hirschl, supra, at 438. 
 180 See Hamoudi, supra note 59, at 692, 710. 
 181 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7–
8 (1996), for an example for American scholars who interpret the Constitution as a carrier for society’s values 
and political tradition.  
 182 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1045, 1064–65 (2004). Echoing Schauer, Ziad Bahaa al-Dein claims that the discussion in Egypt is imprisoned 
in a conception of the constitution as inclusive of all societal values and principles. Ziad Bahaa al-Dein, Al-
Dostor Al-Sagheer wa Al-Dostoor Al-Kabeer [The Small Constitution and the Big Constitution], AL-SHOROUK 
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=12042011&id=8a88b28b-4b80-
4f00-b291-98cf0db594d0. Such a conception increases the perceived stakes by the competing parties. It makes 
the constitution the most crucial document that would govern Egyptian lives for fifty years. Id. Instead he calls 
for a modest view of the constitution..  
 183 Schauer, supra note 182, at 1064–65. 
 184 Id. at 1067. 
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Second, even if one perceives the constitution as embodying the people’s 
identity, it remains to be seen which identity should the constitution endorse. 
American debates show that there is a choice regarding the best conception of 
this identity—whether it is aptly conceived in strictly parochial or in relatively 
more universalistic terms.185 Post-Communist European constitution makers 
faced a similar choice between civic and ethnic conceptions of national 
identity.186 The more the Egyptian or Tunisian constitutions include Islamic 
religious provisions, the more their constitutions are parochial and experienced 
as exclusive by significant parts of the population in these countries. 
Third, the national identity need not necessarily be expressed in a shari’a 
clause. Indeed, constitution drafters have devised different mechanisms—like a 
preamble or directive principles—to deal with controversial, amorphous, or not 
easily achievable goals. Some constitutions establish a division of labor in 
which the cultural aspects of the nation are mostly reflected in the preamble to 
the constitution rather than in the constitutional provisions themselves.187 This 
choice reflects a division of labor between the expressive function of 
preambles and the function of settling disputes that constitutional provisions 
serve.188 Thus, even if one supports the parochial identity-conception of the 
constitution that should not necessarily lead to adopting a judicially 
enforceable shari’a clause. It can be merely declaratory.189 Indeed, Tunisians 
initially considered the judicially enforceable option before the Islamist leading 
party decided against the inclusion of shari’a in the constitution. “An internal 
Ennahda draft was circulated in the weeks following the [electoral] vote that 
stated in the preamble that shari[‘]a would be a ‘source among sources’ of 
 
 185 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988).  
 186 See Ji i P iba , Reconstituting Paradise Lost: Temporality, Civility, and Ethnicity in Post-Communist 
Constitution-Making, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 407 (2004). 
 187 For instance, the cultural influences of Catholicism are evident in the preamble of the Irish 
Constitution. See generally Ir. CONST., 1937. But they also pervade some of the later provisions, including the 
directive principles and the characterization of the family and the state’s responsibility for children. See Ir. 
CONST., 1937, arts. 41–42, 45. Article 44(1) of the Constitution declares: “The State acknowledges that the 
homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and 
honour religion.” Id. art. 44, para. 1. It adds in Article 44(2)(2): “The State guarantees not to endow any 
religion.” Id. art 44, para. 2, cl. 2. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Act removed previous reference 
to specific religious affiliations and established a special status for the Roman Catholic Church. Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution Act 1972 (Act No. 5/1972) (Ir.). 
 188 Sanford Levinson, Do Constitutions Have A Point? Reflections on “Parchment Barriers” and 
Preambles, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, no. 1, 2011. 
 189 Id. at 164. However, there are exceptions like Nepal and France where the preamble has an 
enforceable legal status. Id. at 164–65.  
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legislation.”190 Eventually, Tunisia ratified a constitution on January 26, 2014. 
It included the following paragraph in the preamble: 
Expressing our people’s commitment to the teachings of Islam, to 
their spirit of openness and tolerance, to human values and the high-
est principles of universal human rights, inspired by the heritage of 
our civilization, accumulated over the travails of our history, from 
our enlightened reformist movements that are based on the founda-
tions of our Islamic-Arab identity and on the gains of human civiliza-
tion, and adhering to the national gains achieved by [the Tunisian] 
people.191 
Another alternative is to make the shari’a clause part of the “directive 
principles of social policy” akin to Article 45 of the Irish Constitution and Part 
IV of the Indian Constitution rather than a judicially enforced article.192 Here 
the directive principles would enjoy a higher legal status than merely a 
declaratory status like the preamble but will still be more flexible than other 
constitutional provisions. 
Fourth, the identity of the nation includes non-Muslims, like the Christian 
Copts, who are an integral part of the Egyptian nation. It is unclear, then, why 
the identity of the nation would mean a shari’a clause under such pluralist 
sociological conditions. A shari’a clause entrenches the majority’s identity 
rather than the national identity. If constitutional change requires taking into 
account the different societal interests and hence should lead to a 
generalization of the constitutional text,193 then it is doubtful if an Article 2-
like language in the Egyptian constitution achieves the required inclusive 
generalization. 
Finally, the fact that a country is predominantly Islamic does not mean that 
it is monolithic or predominantly religious.194 As has been observed in the 
American context: “Americans overwhelmingly . . . identify with a religion. 
Identity, however, does not necessarily translate into religious activity because 
not all who identify with a religion frequently attend religious services, or 
engage in other religious behavior.”195 It is true that Arab states are deeply 
 
 190 Pickard, supra note 135. 
 191 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC OF 2014, pmbl. 
 192 Ir. Const., 1937 art. 45; India Const. PART IV.  
 193 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (2003). 
 194 Ahmed T. el-Gaili, Federalism and the Tyranny of Religious Minorities: Challenges to Islamic 
Federalism in Sudan, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. 503, 538 (2004) 
 195 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES 
US 8 (2012).  
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influenced by the history of Islamic civilization but that does not necessarily 
translate into diligent religious commitment. Despite all the talk about 
“religious revival” whether in Islamic or non-Islamic societies, this revival 
“may be,” notes Olivier Roy, “new forms of religious visibility rather than an 
outbreak of religiousness.”196 One needs to distinguish between conservatism, 
religiosity, and political Islam. Though they might overlap, they are distinct 
socio-political phenomena. While it seems true that there is a rise in social 
conservatism in Arab societies compared with earlier decades—which is also 
true of the post-1960s United States—and that this conservatism takes at times 
religious expressions, as in dress codes in the public sphere, one cannot 
collapse conservatism into religiosity. Not all conservatism or traditionalism is 
an expression of religiosity. Within religiosity, one needs to differentiate 
between religious practice and popular forms of faith. Indeed, religious 
practices are socially significant and at times are experienced as more social 
than religious. For instance, many non-practicing Muslims would fast during 
Ramadan—and some would even pray that month—although they are 
generally non-practicing. The reason seems to be social conformity. One 
cannot leap to the conclusion that because most people fast most of them are 
religious. Finally, religiosity, in whatever form, does not necessarily mean that 
practicing or believing Muslims are committed to the project of political Islam 
(and hence want a shari’a clause). 
C. Indeterminacy of Shari’a Interpretation and Liberalization 
The political-realist may argue that shari’a is an abstract concept and would 
have to be interpreted by constitutional court justices and this interpretive 
activity and application are inevitably influenced by normative commitments 
and socio-political considerations.197 Thus, even if one had fears from a 
religious clause these fears need not materialize given the elasticity of abstract 
sacred law, its subordination to political exigency and economic necessity, and 
the ability of largely secular judges to deploy it in a variety of ways.198 Max 
Weber noted, for instance, that: 
The needs of economic life make themselves manifest either through 
a reinterpretation of sacred commandments or through their casuistic 
by-passing. Occasionally we also come upon a simple, practical elim-
 
 196 OLIVIER ROY, HOLY IGNORANCE: WHEN RELIGION AND CULTURE PART WAYS 3 (2010). 
 197 See Nathan J. Brown, Shari’a and State in the Modern Muslim Middle East, 29 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. 
STUD. 359 (1997) (for the various meanings of shari’a). 
 198 Weber, supra note 153, at 577–78.  
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ination of religious injunctions in the course of the ecclesiastical dis-
pensation of penance and grace. One example of this is the elimina-
tion within the Catholic church of. . . the prohibition against usury. . . 
but without any express abrogation. . .199 
The experience of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (“SCC”) shows 
that the shari’a clause can be largely emptied from its religious content by 
various interpretive techniques or watered down by limiting its application on 
procedural and technical grounds. For example, Salafis who claim to be 
originalists and are literalist in their Islamism argue for the application of 
“ahkam” (rules) and not merely “mabadi” (principles) of shari’a.200 In 
particular they call for applying “hudud” (corporal punishment).201 In response 
to these kinds of claims, the SCC used a procedural technique to reject Islamist 
claims that: (1) The Egyptian penal code is incompatible with Article 2 given 
that it refrains from applying an amputation punishment in cases of theft;202 (2) 
the penal code’s provision on adultery is unconstitutional because it merely 
stipulates incarceration rather than the “hudud” corporal punishment;203 (3) or, 
charging interest—which was legal under Egyptian Civil Code—is contrary to 
shari’a.204 
Ran Hirschl argues that in a “constitutional theocracy” courts may be 
designated as a medium for the contestation over religious issues as a strategy 
of containment in which secular judges legitimate the political order while 
simultaneously defending it against more radical religious demands.205 
Lombardi and Brown disagree with Hirschl’s thesis arguing that in the 
Egyptian case the SCC’s jurisprudence “should be considered a bona fide 
contribution to contemporary Islamic thought” and that it cannot be considered 
“un-Islamic” or “non-religious.”206 They argue that an argument that the SCC 
is secularizing Islamic thought implies that some ideas are essentially secular 
and cannot be made from within the religious tradition itself.207 However, it 
seems that Lombardi and Brown are missing the point. It is precisely because 
the secular and the religious/sacred are not binary opposites that the secular 
 
 199 Id; see also id. at 586–87 (on the abandonment of the prohibition on usury in Christianity). 
 200 STEPHANE LACROIX, SHEIKHS AND POLITICIANS: INSIDE THE NEW EGYPTIAN SALAFISM 5 (Brookings 
Doha Center, June 2012). 
 201 Id.  
 202 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no. 32, Judicial year no. 10 (Nov. 4, 1989) (Arabic).  
 203 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no. 34, Judicial year no. 10 (February 3, 1990) (Arabic) (Egypt).  
 204 Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no. 20, Judicial year no. 1 (May 4, 1985) (Arabic) (Egypt).  
 205 HIRSCHL, supra note 32, at 3–4.  
 206 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 107, at 432 (emphasis added). 
 207 Id.  
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can be understood as internal to the religious. The fact that there is a genuine 
disagreement on shari’a amongst religious scholars does not preclude the 
possibility that the effect of judicial rulings or scholarly interventions is to 
secularize shari’a. These rulings move positions within shari’a closer to those 
characteristically identified as secular and liberal in the spectrum of available 
positions.208 This does not mean they are necessarily “non-religious”—though 
some may perceive them as such—because they are (or can be) justified from 
within the religious canon. But they are certainly less religious from the 
perspective of the extremes of the secular/religious spectrum.209 Thus, one may 
believe that it is a bona fide attempt—even though the state judges are not 
religious scholars themselves—and still see the secularizing effect. 
Furthermore, Lombardi and Brown seem to ignore ideological conflict in legal 
interpretation. Judges are not merely engaged in moral disagreement and 
exposition of sacred texts irrespective of profane policy considerations. It is 
through these policy considerations that their ideological commitments 
influence their judicial practice.210 Ideological conflict is obscured by the 
modus operandi of the SCC, which issues unanimous, unsigned decisions 
without dissenting opinions. 
Despite the forgoing, the indeterminacy-based argument fails. This Article 
seeks to assess whether non-religious constitutional drafters who are 
considering to yield to religious demands to enact a shari’a clause should count 
on the indeterminacy of shari’a to move society towards a liberal, secular 
democracy (or at least not risk its further Islamization) despite the shari’a 
clause. This Article argues that one should not. 
1. Limits of Judicial Legitimation 
The effect of a constitutional court’s legitimating force—while real given 
the perception of rule of law and semblance of legality—is quite limited.211 
 
 208 Brown, supra note 197, at 370. 
 209 Indeed Brown himself argues in his earlier writings that:  
[T]he meaning of the sharica has been transformed to the extent that it is the self-proclaimed pro-
ponents of the sharica who insist on viewing it solely [and narrowly] as law [i.e. a body of identi-
fiable rules], whereas more secular writers argue for a broader conception, though it need not al-
ways inform actual legal practice.  
Id.  
 210 See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1998). 
 211 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).  
SULTANY GALLEYSPROOFS 7/10/2014 11:14 AM 
386 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
This limited effect is more likely in cases like authoritarian regimes in which 
the constitution is not revered as it is in the United States. Some scholars argue 
that courts should address the larger public opinion in their rulings in order to 
reach larger audiences and shape public opinion.212 However, the efficacy of 
such appeal to the general public is contingent on many factors. Consider the 
three possible audiences for this liberalizing discourse: the general public, 
elites, and Islamists.  
The general public: the public rarely (if ever) reads court rulings, even the 
highly publicized ones. This is true even in cases like that of the Egyptian 
SCC, which produces very short rulings (no more than few pages’ long) and 
their reasoning is devoid of any scholarly sources or extensive discussions of 
their reasoning that leads them to their conclusions.213 Even previous rulings of 
the Court are rarely mentioned in the text of the rulings.214 As such the SCC 
seems to be following Cass Sunstein’s “minimalism” in the American context 
by offering “incompletely theorized arguments” to support their rulings in 
controversial cases.215 This minimalism is also evident in the fact that many 
rulings simply avoid the substantive questions and rely on procedural devices. 
In many cases the SCC rejected petitions on the grounds that Article 2 does not 
apply retroactively on laws enacted prior to it.216  
Elites: Those members of the elites (lawyers, judges, politicians) who care 
to read these decisions will find minimal discussion that will hardly persuade 
them to reconsider their views.  
Islamists: Islamist activists in the pre-Arab spring era had few reasons to 
trust a court that is appointed by a regime that oppressed them and did nothing 
significant to protect their rights and limit the security establishment and the 
emergency rule.217 They are also unlikely to be impressed by rulings of civil 
 
 212 Erwin Chemerinsky, Judicial Opinions as Public Rhetoric, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1783 (2009) 
(referencing the California Supreme Court). 
 213 See, e.g., Supreme Constitutional Court, Case no. 32, Judicial year no. 10 (Nov. 4, 1989) (Arabic) 
(Egypt).  
 214 Id.  
 215 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 39–41 
(1999). 
 216 See supra notes 203–05. 
 217 Hirschl, supra note 57, at 1832. See Sadiq Reza, Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 532 (2007), for more on Egyptian emergency powers. 
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judges who are not trained in Islamic law and whose rulings do not extensively 
engage with religious texts and scholarly writings.218 
More importantly, the secularization and liberalization account is 
constitutional court-centric,219 and hence it overlooks other domains of law, 
like personal law and criminal law.220 In Egypt, the alleged liberalizing 
tendencies in constitutional law have co-existed with illiberal tendencies in 
other areas of the law. The famous case of the Egyptian scholar and academic 
Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd—whose application of discourse analysis and 
hermeneutics to the religious text has raised the Islamists’ ire—illustrates this 
point vividly.221 The Islamists sought in the first half of the 1990s a judicial 
declaration from the personal status courts (according the shari’a law of 
“hisbah”) against Abu Zayd as an apostate (“murtadd”) from Islam demanding 
his separation from his wife because a Muslim cannot be married to an 
apostate according to shari’a.222 The case ended up in the Court of Cassation, 
which upheld an earlier ruling separating him from his wife.223 Abu Zayd was 
forced into exile.224 
In criminal law, blasphemy laws existed for centuries in Europe and the 
United States.225 Only in recent times did they become increasingly rejected as 
contrary to religious liberty, although traces of these laws have survived 
through other doctrines.226 It took the United Kingdom till 2008 to remove the 
criminalization of blasphemy from its laws, and yet scholars argue that the 
 
 218 Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The 
Constitutionalization of Shari’a in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 81, 122 (1998) (calling 
upon Egyptian judges to “demonstrate greater familiarity with the Qur’an, sunna and texts of the legal 
schools.”)  
 219 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 214 (1995), for the Supreme Court-centrism in American 
constitutional theory.  
 220 See Mayer, supra note 14, at 170–74 (discussing Islamization in criminal law). See Lama Abu-Odeh, 
Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1043 (2004), for personal 
law. This is a question that is not unique to Islamic-majority states. See, e.g., PASCAL FOURNIER, MUSLIM 
MARRIAGE IN WESTERN COURTS: LOST IN TRANSPLANTATION (2010); Michael A. Helfand, Religious 
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 
(2011). 
 221 See generally Fauzi M. Najjar, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd, 27 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 177 (2000).  
 222 Id.  
 223 Id. at 194; Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695, 734–39 (2004).  
 224 See Najjar, supra note 221, at 194.  
 225 See, e.g., Courtney Kenny, The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy, 1 C.L.J. 127, 129 (1922). 
 226 Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in Nineteenth-Century America, 
52 AM. Q. 682–83 (2000) 
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spirit of these laws that protects religious belief and institutions is still intact 
through other legal instruments.227 Blasphemy laws are enforced in Islamic 
states like Pakistan.228 In Egypt many have faced blasphemy charges during 
recent years under 98(f) of the Penal Code.229 More recently, during the 
deliberations leading to the 2012 Constitution, the Constituent Assembly 
considered whether to constitutionalize the prohibition on blasphemy.230 
Similar developments occurred in Tunisia since the uprising.231 These 
developments and practices run contrary to the secularization thesis. 
2. Interpretive Authority 
Another reason to doubt the comforting effect of indeterminacy is the 
independence of the shari’a clause question from the question of interpretive 
authority. Interpretive indeterminacy can go either way, and not necessarily in 
a liberal, secular, rights-protecting direction. This ambiguity of what shari’a 
means can be a reason for excluding it from the constitution given the concerns 
it may give rise to in various sectors of the population.232 It is plausible that 
religious parties that control the parliament and/or the presidency may be able 
to pack constitutional courts with religiously minded judges that would be able 
to disrupt the liberalizing and secularizing tendencies of current judicial 
elites.233 Egyptian judiciary, for example, accused President Morsi and the 
Muslim Brotherhood on April 2013 with attempting to replace 3,000 judges by 
lowering the retirement age from seventy to sixty.234 Lombardi and Brown 
 
 227 Russell Sandberg & Norman Doe, The Strange Death of Blasphemy, 71 MODERN L. REV. 971, 976 
(2008).  
 228 See Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—
Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 303, 310–12 
(2008), for a review of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and an argument that they are defective and unjust. 
 229 See, e.g., Egypt Bans ‘Blasphemous’ Magazine, BBC (April 8, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/middle_east/7989016.stm; Egypt Businessman Naguib Sawiris Faces Blasphemy Trial, BBC (January 9, 
2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16473759; Egyptian Court Upholds Acourt upholds 
ctor Adel Imam’s Sentence, BBC (April 25, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
17832703.  
 230 Constituent Assembly Proposes Article Criminalizing Blasphemy, EGYPT INDEP. (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/constituent-assembly-proposes-article-criminalizing-blasphemy.  
 231 Amnesty Int’l, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?: One Year Since Tunisia’s Landmark Elections, 
24, AI Index MDE 30/010/2012 (Oct. 2012).  
 232 See Ben Ahmad, supra note 148, for Ghannoushi’s explaination in the Tunisian case. 
 233 E.g., Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Theocracy, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 152 
(2011) (book review). See also Moustafa, supra note 54 at 924–26 (discussing the packing of the Court during 
Mubarak’s era). 
 234 Egypt’s Morsi Meets with Top Judicial Body Amid Tensions Over Judiciary, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 22, 
2013), available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/69890.aspx.  
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acknowledge the possibility of a conservative turn, yet they argue that it “may 
be checked by a respect for precedent.”235 This argument, however, 
underestimates the manipulability of precedent. Precedents are more central to 
American jurisprudence than in Egypt,236 and yet they have been 
manipulated.237 American experience shows that judges do not need to 
overrule a precedent explicitly: For example, judges may find a precedent 
inapplicable to a specific case before them because it is factually different or 
recognize an exception distinguishing it from the precedent. It follows that 
precedents are likely to be even less of an obstacle before conservative judges 
in Egypt where precedent is not as central. Certainly, the practice of the SCC 
to refrain in general from mentioning precedents in its rulings shows the 
marginality of precedent. 
But there is another way in which conservative Islamists can retain a hold 
on interpretive authority outside the constitutional court by requiring a certain 
degree of involvement of theological jurists in legislation. Indeed, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political platform of 2004 called for establishing a religious 
council elected by the community of religious scholars to advice the executive 
and legislative branches on matters pertaining to shari’a and it suggested that 
this advice might be binding on certain issues.238 During the debates on 
amending Article 2 in 2012, the Egyptian Constitutive Assembly suggested 
that the al-Azhar University be consulted for shari’a interpretation issues.239 
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights objected to this amendment 
declaring that it both encroaches upon the power of elected branches and 
politicizes al-Azhar.240 The Salafists opposed this amendment before an 
eventual agreement on retaining the original phrasing of Article 2 was 
reached.241 However, as mentioned above, Article 3 of the December 2012 
Constitution requires consulting al-Azhar in matters pertaining to shari’a.242 
 
 235 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 107, at 434. 
 236 Id. at 433. 
 237 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 275 (2008) (“A sponge is not constraining; nor, in 
the Supreme Court, is precedent. . . . The Court is reluctant to overrule its previous decisions, but the 
reluctance is prudential rather than dictated by law.”)  
 238 NATHAN J. BROWN & AMR HAMZAWY, BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS 19–20 (2010). 
 239 Islam’s Status Unchanged in Egypt Draft Constitution, al-Azhar Made Reference, REUTERS, Nov. 29, 
2012, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2012/11/29/islams-status-remains-same-in-egypt-draft-
constitution-al-azhar-made-reference/.  
 240 See Press Release, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, (July 16, 2012), http://eipr.org/pressrelease/ 
2012/07/16/1453. 
 241 Islam’s Status Unchanged in Egypt Draft Constitution, supra note 239. 
 242 See supra Subpart B.1 of the Introduction. 
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3. What’s the Rationale? 
The forgoing questions the rationale for incorporating shari’a, its 
indeterminacy notwithstanding. It is unclear why one should have the clause in 
the first place if one is counting on secular judges and their avoidance 
devices—as in Bickel’s “passive virtues”243—or interpretive techniques to 
make the clause relatively dead or to secularize the political order.244 Or, 
alternatively and as suggested above, shari’a can be included either in a 
preamble statement or a directive constitutional principle or an overridable 
clause, and then it becomes relatively easier to make the clause ineffective.245 
Or, as in the Turkish case, the Constitution is secular and then there is no need, 
as in the Egyptian case, to pay lip service to a shari’a clause while secularizing 
the legal regime.246 In any event, enacting a shari’a clause while counting on 
judges to make it practically empty is an invitation for judges to exercise 
political judgment on the occasions in which they employ restraint or 
avoidance techniques.247 Exercising such a political judgment undermines the 
supposed difference between the judicial branch and the political branches. 
Therefore, it weakens the justification at the basis of delegating these questions 
of religion to the supposedly professional and non-political branch. 
D. Transparency and Explicit Recognition: Lessons from the U.S.? 
Secular normative discourse is no less prone to indeterminacy than shari’a. 
Hence, it may be argued (in an opposite move to the previous argument) that it 
is pointless to exclude an explicit shari’a clause from the constitution when 
constitutional courts in presumably secular states can indirectly advance 
religious goals, practices, actors, and institutions. Accordingly, the difference 
between Islamic constitutionalism in Egypt and American constitutionalism is 
merely one of degree rather than kind. 
 
 243 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 111 (2d ed. 1986) (1962). 
 244 As in Egypt’s SCC narrow interpretation of Article 2 and wide discretion of legislature leading to few 
cases of striking down laws. See Stilt, supra note 223, at 726–27. 
 245 See supra Part I.B.  
 246 See Bâli, supra note 114, at 240. 
 247 Mark Tushnet, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Regimes: Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein, in 
THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, 
AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 23–43 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005) 
(claiming that Bickel and Sunstein fail to draw a convincing distinction between law and politics). 
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1. Religion in the U.S. 
In the United States, there are many manifestations of religion in 
government, for example on currency and in pledges, courtrooms, and 
schools.248 The U.S. Supreme Court has advanced religious goals under the 
guise of secular rhetoric.249 For instance, in McGowan v. Maryland, the Court 
held that while Sunday laws requiring the closure of business on Sundays have 
a religious origin aiming at promoting church attendance, it can be recast as 
secular as a uniform day of rest.250 In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court upheld the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayers because it is a long-
standing and widely-accepted practice that has become “[p]art of the fabric of 
our society.”251 On the question of public display of Christmas symbols, the 
Court held that this display plays a secular function and thus it is not 
unconstitutional.252 The Court has allowed the government to subsidize 
religious institutions in indirect ways, and it has denied that such aid violated 
the Establishment Clause.253 Unlike its approach of formal neutrality and 
color-blindness in race-related equal protection cases, the Court allows more 
discretion to the government to take religion-conscious decisions “even where 
the resulting actions arguably discriminate in favor of or against religion.”254 
The backdoor introduction of positions characteristically identified with 
conservative religious groups is also manifested in questions related to civil 
 
 248 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Religion As a Basis of Law-making?: Herein of the Non-establishment of 
Religion, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 105, 107–08 (2009) (“There are many different ways in which 
government in the United States affirms, or has affirmed, one or more religious premises. Here are some 
prominent examples: in 1954, the Congress of the United States added the words ‘under God’ to the Pledge of 
Allegiance (‘one nation under God’). Also in 1954, ‘Congress requested that all US coins and paper currency 
bear the slogan, ‘In God We Trust.’ On July 11, 1955, President Eisenhower made this slogan mandatory on 
all currency. In 1956 the national motto was changed from ‘E Pluribus Unum’ to ‘In God We Trust.’ The 
proceedings of many courts in the United States, including the United States Supreme Court, begin with a 
court official intoning ‘God save the United States and this Honorable Court.’ Some states provided that their 
public schools should begin the day with Bible reading or prayer. Some state officials, including some state 
judges, posted the Ten Commandments on government property, such as a public school classroom or hallway, 
a courtroom wall, or a courthouse lawn.”) (citations omitted)). 
 249 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 250 Id. at 434–36422.  
 251 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
 252 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680–85 (1984).  
 253 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) (holding that taxpayers did 
not have standing to challenge subsidies provided to a religious organization); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793, 835 (2000) (holding that a school-aid program that lends educational materials and equipment to religious 
schools is constitutional); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002) (holding that school voucher 
programs that sponsor students who opt for religious schools is constitutional).  
 254 Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2012). 
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and individual liberties. The infringement of these liberties in ways consistent 
with views held by conservative religious groups need not invoke religious 
reasoning. Justice White, writing the opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, upheld 
the constitutionality of a Georgia law prohibiting homosexual relations in 
private by invoking neutral notions, including privacy, the Due Process Clause, 
and whether the Constitution confers a right to engage in consensual sodomy, 
rather than sectarian religious reasons.255 In Lawrence v. Texas, which 
overruled Bowers, Justice Scalia’s dissent focused, at least in part, on 
respecting the will of the democratic majority and not succumbing to judicial 
activism in order to affect social change. 256 In Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health, the state justified its refusal to recognize same-sex marriages on 
grounds of protecting children’s welfare.257 
The skepticism toward the image of impartial judiciary in cases related to 
religion and state is by no means limited to the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, 
recent empirical evidence from lower federal courts in the United States 
suggests that political leanings of judges influence their decisions on 
Establishment Clause cases. Sisk and Heise show that Democratic-appointed 
judges are more likely than Republican-appointed judges to uphold 
Establishment Clause challenges.258 They write: “In the context of federal 
court claims implicating questions of Church and State, it appears to be 
ideology much, if not all, of the way down.”259 
2. Transparency and Bargaining Power 
Building on such examples, the argument proceeds, it is preferable to be 
more transparent about the constitutional arrangements and practices of the 
country in question. Secular lip service that masks religious and sectarian 
motivations makes the legal-political order non-transparent to law-abiding 
citizens. Transparency would alert these citizens to a constitutional change—
through judicial interpretation—that they would not otherwise notice. 
 
 255 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Although it should be noted that Justice Burger’s 
concurrence states: “Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state 
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in 
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards. Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law.” 
 256 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 257 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 333–34 (2003). This argument, however, was not 
successful with the Massachusetts court. Id. 
 258 Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of 
Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204–05 (2012).  
 259 Id. at 1204 (emphasis in original).  
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Transparency here would possibly require candor and sincerity in judicial 
opinion-writing by exposing the real judicial motivations and not their 
rationalizations.260 Yet, for others it primarily means a sincere attempt in 
making arguments that would be acceptable to fellow reasonable citizens who 
are interested in fair terms of social cooperation and this would mean recourse 
to general justifications even if other sectarian justifications were available.261 
However, the argument is unconvincing because the question here involves 
more than mere transparency. To begin with, the discussion of a shari’a clause 
(i.e. an establishment clause) differs from that of the Establishment Clause (i.e. 
an anti-establishment clause). Indeterminacy in the latter, which prohibits state 
support of religious practices in judicial rulings, allows what an Establishment 
Clause is supposed to prevent.262 The situation of a shari’a clause would be the 
reverse: the clause would prohibit laws contradicting Islamic law and judicial 
rulings are required to apply it in some way.263 The malleability of secular 
discourse, given the ability of judges to manipulate it for religious causes, 
cannot be a reason to wither away impartiality altogether.264 
Moreover, a formal constitutional entrenchment of religion may be more 
religion and not only more transparency. In other words, the explicit 
recognition and emphasis may make the advancement of religious practices 
and institutions easier and more natural. Constitutional structures and 
provisions influence political practice.265 A regime in which Islamic law is 
constitutionalized changes the bargaining power of different political groups 
with respect to different fundamental and controversial issues in the polity. The 
bargaining power of these groups will be different than in a situation where 
 
 260 See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Micah 
Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008), for such an argument. See Scott C. Idleman, A 
Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995), for a critique of the candor thesis. 
 261 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 765, 770 (1997); see Chris Eberle, Religion and Political Theory, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-politics/ (Oct. 2, 2008) (summarizing the debates in question). 
 262 U.S. CONST. amend. 1; See Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, 
and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 59 (2006), 
for an argument against transparency, i.e. against the abandonment of the imperfect principle of governmental 
neutrality towards religion, in the Establishment Clause context. 
 263 See supra Introduction.  
 264 Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 88, 89 (2006) (arguing that the Secular 
Purpose Doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court should be retained in order to make sense of the Establishment 
Clause despite the difficulties and objections the doctrine faces); Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and 
Power: The Limits of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871–72 (1996) (arguing 
that neutrality privileges the majority’s religion). 
 265 See generally MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2011). 
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such constitutional straitjacketing is absent. No wonder that it is politically 
difficult in Egypt to have a constitution without the shari’a clause given that it 
is already enacted in the previous constitution and is part of the status quo,266 
whereas it is difficult to include a shari’a clause in Tunisia given that it is not 
present in the previous constitution and is not part of the status quo (although 
both states stipulated in their constitutions that Islam is the official religion of 
the state).267 
To conclude, the four assumptions on which normative and realist 
arguments rest should be rejected. It follows that the normative and realist 
arguments fail to establish the case for the constitutionlization of shari’a. 
II. NORMATIVE AND PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ISLAMIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
I turn now to making the case against Islamic constitutionalism. The 
arguments I offer below differ from arguments made on grounds of religious 
value belief (like An-Na’im’s that emphasize the voluntary and individualistic 
nature of belief and hence its incompatibility with coercive enforcement by 
state law).268 Additionally, this Article will not distinguish in making the 
arguments below between different versions of the shari’a clause. The 
variation in the phrasing of shari’a clauses includes: “shari’a is a source of 
legislation,” or “a primary/principal source of legislation,” or “the primary 
source of legislation,” or “one of the main sources.” Although it is generally 
perceived that a language that signals more emphasis is more Islamic or carries 
more weight (as in the Egyptian amendment to Article 2 from “a primary 
source” to “the primary source”), in my view that is a misconception. Whether 
the clause will carry more religious weight and what kind of weight depends 
on the interpretation and application of the clause as well as the institutional 
arrangements to enforce the clause.269 Specifically, it would depend on the 
effect of the legal actors’ work in interpreting these different versions of 
clauses.270 
 
 266 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 
2005, March 26, 2007.  
 267 CONSTITUTION OF THE TUNISIAN REPUBLIC of 1957. 
 268 See, e.g., An-Na’im, supra note 108, at 3.  
 269 Mayer, supra note 14, at 138 (“[I]t does not appear that the adoption of one or the other wording is 
actually correlated in practice with the presence of a greater or lesser proportion of shari’a-based rules in a 
given legal system.”). 
 270 DUNCAN KENNEDY, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 518, 521 (1986).  
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In what follows, the Article makes three main arguments: First, a shari’a 
clause in a pluralist society excludes some citizens and discriminates against 
them both on the symbolic/expressive and the rights’ distribution levels 
(Subpart A). Second, it leads to polarization that destabilizes the political 
system and may lead to violence. Thus, it becomes part of the problem rather 
than a mechanism for conflict resolution (Subpart B). Third, this polarization 
happens for the wrong reasons and produces bad effects: on the one had, it has 
distraction effects because it focuses on the wrong issues and sidelines more 
important issues, and on the other hand, its resolution is legalized despite its 
political nature and its resolution is handed over to the hands of the few 
(Subpart C). 
A. Alienation and Religious Equality 
1. Alienation and Exclusion 
Both Egypt and Tunisia are sociologically pluralist countries with sizable 
non-Muslim religious minorities. Egypt’s Christian population (Coptic, 
Armenian, Catholic, Protestant) is about ten percent of the overall population 
and there are small numbers of citizens belonging to other religions like Baha’i 
and Judaism.271 Only two percent of the Tunisian population is either Christian 
or Jewish.272 In both states there is a strong secular base.273 Declaring Islam as 
the official religion of the state in Egypt’s and Tunisia’s constitutions 
expressively excludes minorities and discriminates against them on the basis of 
religious affiliation.274 But that declaration is likely to be expressive and 
 
 271 It is difficult to find accurate numbers and percentages of Christians in Egypt as the state declines to 
disclose these numbers and the political sensitivity surrounding this issue. See Abdel Rahman Youssef, 
Egyptian Copts: It’s All in the Number, AL-AKHBAR, Sept. 30, 2012, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12728 
(“Various numbers are thrown around between these two extremes [3 and 25 million]. Many institutions have 
come to the conclusion that the number of Christians is closer to 10 percent of the population, that is, about 8 
million people. This is an average number used by those who walk a tightrope on this issue.”); see also CIA, 
Egypt, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2012–13, at 223, 224 (50th Anniversary ed. 2012) [hereinafter THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK] (“Muslim (mostly Sunni) [ninety percent] 90%, Coptic [nine percent] 9%, other Christian [one 
percent] 1%”). 
 272 CIA, Tunisia, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 272, at 735, 736 (“Muslim (Islam - official) 
[ninety-eight percent] 98%, Christian [one percent] 1%, Jewish and other [one percent] 1%”). 
 273 Al-Nahar, Tunisia Puts Arab Spring Back on the Secular Path, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/tunisia-arab-spring-back-secular-path.html. 
 274 Mayer, supra note 14, at 147. 
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symbolic,275 if not accompanied by a shari’a clause. It is such a clause that is 
likely to materialize the potential for discrimination and exclusion. 
It is true that religious tolerance is possible even under a theocracy (as was 
the case under the Ottoman regime which granted an autonomous status to 
religious groups with respect to personal status).276 Indeed, some Islamic 
scholars have rejected the second-class designation of non-Muslim minorities 
in an Islamic state.277 But such tolerance is granted against conditions of 
inequality in which the different religious groups do not stand at the same 
distance from the state apparatus. Indeed, such an arrangement enables a 
religious group to prioritize its interests and subjugate the state structure and 
public policy to these interests. 
The incorporation of shari’a in the Egyptian constitution has not been 
hitherto a mere formality. The endorsement of state religion may be more aptly 
compared to England so long as it is merely symbolic and formal.278 A shari’a 
clause, however, endangers such formality. A shari’a clause is an instrument of 
judicial review by which laws in the polity that delineate citizens’ rights, 
benefits, and opportunities are upheld, struck down, or interpreted by the 
constitutional court from a religious prism. Thus, a shari’a clause goes to the 
heart of membership in the political community. A shari’a clause does not 
define membership or condition it on belonging to a religious community and 
according to criteria decided by religious authorities. That will be a more 
extreme case and more objectionable. Yet, a shari’a clause symbolizes the 
political community’s fundamental commitment to shari’a although it does not 
determine what shari’a means and requires in specific cases. Shari’a’s 
constitutional entrenchment is likely to influence the distribution of rights, 
benefits, and opportunities in the community. As Justice O’Connor writes in 
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly with reference to the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the 
political community. . . . Endorsement sends a message to nonadher-
 
 275 Id. at 137 (noting that “the fact that Islam is or is not formally made the State religion does not by itself 
have any influence in determining the role Islam actually plays in a given country.”).  
 276 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 230–31 (1991). 
 277 See generally RACHEL M. SCOTT, THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL ISLAM: NON-MUSLIMS AND THE 
EGYPTIAN STATE 2 (2010); ABOU EL FADL ET. AL., supra note 107. 
 278 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 57 
(2006) (according to Dworkin, England is formally a religious-tolerant state, but in practice a secular-tolerant 
state). 
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ents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political commu-
nity, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community.279 
This sense of exclusion, alienation and inferiority exists with respect to state 
establishment of shari’a. As the case of Sudan—prior to its ultimate breakup 
into two states—shows, the Southern Sudanese rejected an Islamic-based 
federal system in Sudan given their exclusion.280 
Rejecting the shari’a clause does not mean that religious questions will not 
be dealt with in the public sphere (such as questions related to free exercise 
and which forms of religious practice should a state tolerate and 
accommodate). Nor does rejecting a shari’a clause mean that such a separation 
between a state and religion would guarantee tolerance or religious liberty or 
equality between adherents of different religions. Indeed, there are different 
models of separation and secular states can be oppressive.281 As Martha 
Nussbaum argues, the metaphor of “separation” is “confusing” and cannot be 
understood without the backdrop of liberty (to practice one’s beliefs) and equal 
respect and concern.282 Separation of state and religion primarily means that 
the state as an institutional embodiment of the political community is not 
synonymous with a religious community.283 It means that the laws that apply to 
and affect all citizens qua citizens should not be made with a specific view of 
compliance to a sectarian religious code. No matter how universal and abstract 
are these requirements interpreted to be, they still find their genesis, rhetoric, 
and resources in this partial religious legal tradition. The constitutional court 
becomes entangled in religious debates, concepts, and sources given its need to 
provide justifications for its positions from within this religious law.284 The 
Egyptian SCC, according to Lombardi and Brown, had to find an interpretive 
methodology that can be acceptable within shari’a in order to legitimate its 
liberalizing rulings.285 The absence of a shari’a clause relieves the SCC from 
 
 279 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 280 El-Gaili, supra note 194, at 539. 
 281 W. Cole Durham, Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in 2 RELIGIOUS 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Johan D. van Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 
1996)  
 282 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY 20–21 (2008). 
 283 Ira M. Lapidus, The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society, 6 
INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 363, 365 (1975). 
 284 Lombardi & Brown, supra note 107, at 417 (noting that the constitutional court needed to find 
justification within shari’a in order to justify human rights decisions). 
 285 Id. 
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such sectarian and potentially divisive justificatory requirements. The presence 
of a shari’a clause creates a presumption in favor of such justificatory 
requirements. 
This is not to deny that even secular state courts like those in the United 
States occasionally cite religious sources in their opinions.286 Similarly, the 
Indian Supreme Court justified the Indian “ethos” of secularism (which it 
equated to toleration) on the basis of religious sources.287 It is, however, one 
thing to use such sources occasionally to serve as a secondary and supportive 
role; it is quite another to make them a primary test for the validity of laws. 
Additionally, it is one thing to use references to multiple religious traditions (to 
imply, say, universal applicability of certain ideas), and it is quite another to 
use one religion exclusively despite societal pluralism. 
To understand the problematic nature of a shari’a clause, we need to 
distinguish between two functions of a counter-majoritarian clause: one that 
entrenches majority’s power and another that restricts it. The problem with a 
shari’a clause is not with its counter-majoritarianism per se; rather it lies in the 
way this alleged counter-majoritarianism functions. A shari’a clause might be 
considered counter-majoritarian in a basic sense: a current majority 
entrenching its choices against the choices of future majorities, and a group of 
unelected judges enforcing these choices of the dead on the living. This is the 
kind of counter-majoritarianism that constitutional scholars seek often to 
justify by arguing, for example, that it is necessary to protect “discrete and 
insular minorities.”288 In this sense, there is no difference between this counter-
majoritianism and U.S. counter-majoritarian arrangements.289 The function of 
the shari’a clause counter-majoritarianism, however, differs from standard 
counter-majoritarian constitutional provisions, like an Establishment Clause or 
an Equal Protection Clause. Courts, especially when not committed to an 
approach of formal neutrality, can deploy such clauses to achieve a “dualist” 
function: to protect minorities from discrimination and prevent the 
 
 286 Adam Shinar & Anna Su, Religious Law as Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 74, 96 (2013).  
 287 Faruqui v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 605 (India) (examining the constitutionality of a 
parliamentary act dealing with a religious dispute between Hindus and Muslims over a religious site.)  
 288 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 289 See, e.g., Azizah Al-Hibri, Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy, 24 CASE W. RES. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 17–19 (1992) (claiming that the “antimajoritarian difficulty” in American constitutionalism is not 
different from that of Islamic constitutionalism). For al-Hibri the unamendability of the Quran does not 
differentiate it from the U.S. Constitution given that the main instrument for constitutional change is 
reinterpretation which is available in both the Islamic and the American cases. Id. 
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entrenchment of majorities’ power.290 Yet, a shari’a clause is more likely to 
achieve the opposite objective: to entrench a religious majority’s interests (as 
defined by its leaders and elites) and discriminate against minorities. If so, this 
kind of counter-majoritarianism can hardly be defended as consistent with a 
constitutional conception of democracy because it defeats the purpose of 
imposing constraints on majorities. A sectarian religious code like the shari’a 
clause can hardly be defended as a deontological value or a collective interest 
of all citizens, whether Muslim or not, religious or not.291 
2. The Dualist Effect of a Shari’a Clause: The Case of the Coptic Minority 
Yet the problematic nature here goes beyond alienation and exclusion. A 
shari’a clause has a double majoritarian and counter-majoritarian effect on the 
Coptic minority in Egypt: one is external and majoritarian (the Muslim 
majority vis-à-vis the Copts in general) and another is internal and counter-
majoritarian (empowering the Church vis-à-vis Coptic lay persons). Let us 
recount briefly the position of the Coptic Church on this clause. Initially, the 
Coptic Church vehemently opposed President Anwar Sadat’s Islamization 
program, which included Article 2.292 Paul Sedra writes: 
Due to the ‘Islamization’ program embraced by Sadat, the partnership 
between Patriarch and President cultivated by [Patriarch] Kirollos 
was in tatters. By November 1972, in an atmosphere charged with 
sectarianism, an unauthorized church in the Delta village of Khanka 
was set ablaze, and [Patriarch] Shenouda sent a hundred priests and 
four hundred laymen to pray at the site of the arson. The incident dis-
played the resolve of the Patriarch and infuriated Sadat. Through a 
series of conferences, Shenouda publicly opposed the efforts of the 
regime to foreground Islam in the public sphere. The conferences 
demanded government protection of Christians and their property, 
freedom of belief and worship, an end to the seizure of Church prop-
erty by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, the abandonment of 
efforts to apply Islamic law to non-Muslims, as well as greater Coptic 
representation in labor unions, professional associations, local and 
regional councils, and parliament. Ultimately, Shenouda found him-
self swept up in the purge of purported regime opponents that shortly 
 
 290 Milligan, supra note 254, at 424. 
 291 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 182, at 1057. 
 292 Paul Sedra, Class Cleavages and Ethnic Conflict: Coptic Christian Communities in Modern Egyptian 
Politics, 10 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS 219, 226 (1999) (“[Patriarch] Shenouda refused to 
pledge his loyalty to the regime—particularly one that declared, ‘the principles of Islamic law constitute a 
major source for legislation.’”).  
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preceded Sadat’s assassination, and he was placed under house arrest 
at the Monastery of Saint Bishoy.293 
In the aftermath of these oppressive measures, the Patriarch Shenouda—the 
head of the Coptic Church—restored a good working relationship with 
Mubarak’s rule akin to the state-church alliance during President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s rule.294 He did not oppose the constitution.295 But this position did not 
stem from a change of heart regarding the shari’a clause and the Islamization 
of the state.296 Rather, it was based on strategic considerations to foster the 
status and power of the Coptic Church within the Coptic community vis-à-vis 
the Coptic laity.297 This explains his opposition in 2007 to abolishing Article 
2.298 In the aftermath of Mubarak’s ouster, the Church’s public positions 
maintained the same considerations. In March 2011 the Patriarch demanded an 
addition to Article 2 that would address non-Muslims.299 A year later he 
expressed his desire to change Article 2 to include a reference not only to 
“principles of shari’a” but also “principles of other religions.”300 Sedra 
explains: 
To acknowledge the shari’a and call for recognition of Coptic per-
sonal status law was simply to reinforce the status of the Church as 
the central institution in Copts’ daily lives, as well as his own status 
as the sole legitimate representative of the Coptic community. Insofar 
as the power over personal status afforded the power to define the 
Coptic community, [Patriarch Shenouda] was determined to retain 
that power exclusively on behalf of the Church.301 
This account shows that the Church initially opposed—as one would expect it 
would—the shari’a clause. It withdrew its vocal opposition only after state 
 
 293 Paul Sedra, The Church, Maspero, and the Future of the Coptic Community, JADALIYYA, Mar. 19, 
2012, available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4735/the-church-maspero-and-the-future-of-the-
coptic-co.  
 294 Id. 
 295 Paul Sedra, Copts and the Power Over Personal Status, JADALIYYA, Dec. 3, 2012, available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8741/copts-and-the-power-over-personal-status. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Imad Khalil, Patriarch Shenouda Asks ‘Al-Jamal’ [Deputy Prime Minister] to Include a Paragraph to 
the Constitution’s Article 2 Regarding Non-Muslims, AL-MASRY AL-YOUM, Mar. 21, 2011, http://www. 
almasryalyoum.com/node/367877 (Arabic).  
 300 Jamal Gerges al-Mzahem, Patriarch Shenouda recommends retaining Article 2 of the constitution, 
AL-YOUM AL-SABE’A, Mar. 3, 2012, available at http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=616876& 
(Arabic).  
 301 Sedra, supra note 295.  
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oppression.302 And when it did, this change was based on strategic 
considerations that effectively disempower Coptic individuals by enhancing 
the institutional power of the Church and its monopoly over Coptic citizens’ 
affairs.303 It seems then that a shari’a clause would empower religious groups, 
though unevenly, vis-à-vis citizens. In the public sphere, the dominant group is 
the Islamic religious group from which the state is not separated. Against this 
backdrop of Islamization of the public sphere, the Coptic Church enjoys a 
jurisdiction over Coptic citizens because their religion has been privatized. As 
Michael Karayanni—who have observed this phenomenon in Israel—notes, 
the debate on the separation of state and religion in these cases excludes 
minority members because they are relegated to the multicultural category of 
minority accommodation.304 Karayanni also notes the normative implications 
of such arrangements: the dominance of the majority’s views is likely to 
influence the formation of public norms that have implications for religious 
questions that concern minority members.305 Furthermore, this minority 
accommodation undermines the prospects of liberal reforms in the minority’s 
religious institutions.306 
It follows, then, that the lack of separation doubly assaults the Coptic 
citizens—especially those who are not religious—once in the general structure 
of the state (from which the Copts—whether religious or secular—are 
excluded) and another in the empowerment of the Church, which chains those 
who might not seek any institutional affiliation with the Church under different 
conditions.307 The Church’s power benefited from other factors like the 
withdrawal of the state’s role as a provider of welfare services.308 This led to 
Copts’ dependency on the Church, which stretched its role beyond the spiritual 
realm and provided educational and economic assistance.309 This enabled the 
Church to become a “cornerstone of the. . . Coptic identity.”310 
 
 302 See id. 
 303 See generally id. 
 304 Karayanni, supra note 179, at 42. 
 305 Id. at 68. 
 306 Id. at 68–69. 
 307 Id. at 71 (noting the potential implications of a lack of separation in countries where the majority 
religion acquired political dominance). 
 308 MAY MASSAAD, THE COPTS OF EGYPT: STATE DISCRIMINATION AND EXCLUSION 12–13 (Sept. 14, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/fddaec13-9515-439b-
9fb9-c6078b0d6979.  
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 13.  
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This arrangement marginalized Coptic individuals and undermined their 
political participation because the Church mediated their relationship with the 
state. According to one journalistic account: 
For years, Christians largely relied on the Church to secure some pro-
tection for their rights, using [Partriach] Shenouda’s close relation-
ship with Mubarak. With Mubarak’s ouster in a popular uprising last 
year and Shenouda’s death, many have been emboldened to act be-
yond the Church’s hold and participate more directly in the nation’s 
politics to demand rights, better representation and freedom of wor-
ship.311 
The Church’s strategic considerations are not necessarily tied to the presence 
of a shari’a clause. The Church had a similar relationship with the state and 
similar considerations during Nasser’s rule when the constitution did not 
include a reference to shari’a as a source for legislation and even the reference 
to Islam as the official religion was absent from the 1958 Constitution.312 The 
Church abandoned its opposition to the shari’a clause only when the Sadat 
regime made it clear that supporting the clause is mandatory. Should the 
constitutional order lack a shari’a clause the Church will seek to foster its 
institutional power in a different way. The post-Shenouda Church seems to be 
moving in that direction: Its representatives boycotted the vote in the 
Constituent Assembly313 and opposed the draft of the 2012 Constitution 
because it was exclusive, “too religious,” and because “religious laws have no 
place in the constitution.”314 
B. Political Considerations: Polarization and Backlash 
In both Egypt and Tunisia, a deep distrust colored secular-religious 
relations in the aftermath of the revolution. The secularists suspected that the 
ruling Islamist parties are seeking to consolidate their power and establish an 
autocratic regime.315 In Egypt, they further accused the Muslim Brotherhood of 
 
 311 Sarah El Deeb, Egypt’s New Pope Opposes Religious Constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 5, 2012, 
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egypts-new-pope-says-copts-marginalized-years.  
 312 PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC Mar. 5, 1958 (Egypt) (missing the 
provision regarding Islam as the religion of the state and shari’a as a source for legislation). 
 313 David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Islamists Approve Draft Constitution Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2012, at A6. 
 314 El Deeb, supra note 311. 
 315 See, e.g., Fatal clashes on Egypt uprising anniversary, BBC, (January 25, 2013, 4:09 PM), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21191260; Tunisia Braces for Mass Protests, ALJAZEERA, (Feb. 8, 
2013, 8:46), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/02/20132854423171526.html. 
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cutting a deal with the army at the early stages and betraying the revolution.316 
In Tunisia they further argued that state policies emboldened hardline ultra-
conservative Salafi groups.317 The Islamist movements, on the other hand, 
understood the opposition’s moves—especially in Egypt—as an attempt to 
undermine their rule in order to achieve what the opposition could not achieve 
through the ballot box.318 Against this backdrop, a shari’a clause is likely to 
further polarize the population and lead to intractable and unnecessary disputes 
that may destabilize the country and undermine the consensus building process 
needed in constitution-making processes. 
1. Polarization and Violence 
Polarization often signals intractable and uncompromising distant 
positions. It does not necessarily signify uncivil and violent debates.319 It may 
occur amongst ruling elites and amongst the general public. Polarization may 
lead to political stalemate, to short-lived governments, and non-governability. 
Violence is likely to occur when organized groups and parties seek to recruit 
the street through mass protests to resolve this stalemate.320 Randolph Roth 
convincingly shows that periods of political instability correlate with higher 
rates of homicide in the United States and Europe: 
The three most important correlates of homicide were thus in place in 
much of the Western world during the Age of Revolution: political 
instability, a loss of governmental legitimacy, and a decline in fellow 
feeling among citizens. Together, these conditions created feelings of 
anger, alienation, and powerlessness that caused homicide rates to 
spike.321 
 
 316 Sherif Tarek, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Ruling military: Deal or No deal? AHRAM ONLINE, 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/22042/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Muslim-
Brotherhood-and-ruling-military-Deal.aspx.  
 317 Wyre Davies, Resurgence of revolt where Arab Spring began, BBC, Feb. 7, 2013, http://www.bbc.co. 
uk/news/world-africa-21377369. 
 318 Mohammad Hajjaj, ‘Al-Ikhwan’: Maseerat Al-Tanahhi Leiskat ‘Morsi’ Inkilab ‘ala Al-Demokratiyya 
wa Istinsakh le Al-Thawra. . . [The ‘Brotherhood’: Resignation marches to overthrow ‘Morsi’ are a coup 
against democracy and a cloning of the revolution. . . AL-YOUM AL-SABE’A, Feb. 11, 2013 (Arabic), http:// 
www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=941521&SecID=12.  
 319 Paul DiMaggio, John Evans & Bethany Bryson, Have Americans’ Social Attitudes Become More 
Polarized? 102 AM. J. SOC. 690, 692–93 (1996). 
 320 Id. at 693; see ADRIENNE LEBAS, FROM PROTEST TO PARTIES: PARTY BUILDING AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 254–56 (2013). 
 321 RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 145 (2009). Roth writes:  
Old neighborhood feuds are also likely to turn murderous during periods of political instability. 
When governments break down, men kill for what appear to be purely personal reasons, aveng-
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The post-Arab Spring developments are consistent with this thesis. The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released a study in April 2011 suggesting 
that homicide rates tripled in Egypt after the revolution compared with 2009 
numbers.322 To the extent that polarization increases the political instability, 
leads to loss of legitimacy in the eyes of a large segment of the public, and 
demonization of other groups of citizens then it may well lead to higher rates 
of violence and ultimately homicide.323 In post-revolutionary and politically 
unstable Egypt and Tunisia we have witnessed a recurring return to street 
mobilization.324 This tactics led to many incidents of violence between 
demonstrators belonging to different factions or due to police brutality.325 The 
latter further galvanized demonstrators.326 The dramatic scenes coming 
repeatedly from Cairo—especially after the June 30 demonstrations and July 3, 
2013 coup—with groups of citizens facing each other without the mediation of 
police forces, and the assassination of opposition leaders in Tunisia are 
troublesome signs of the potential effects of polarization and instability.327 
In theory, polarization may have good effects like higher levels of 
participation in formal politics. However, Egypt witnessed low levels of 
 
ing wrongs, settling scores, and simply getting rid of people they don’t like. They may be moved 
to do so by lack of sanction. . ., a fear that their enemies will kill them first, or partisanship . . . . 
Regardless of the motive, these feuds can take on a life of their own and draw in more combat-
ants. Homicide rates can thus reach catastrophic levels during periods of political instability and 
can remain high for decades. Once learned, homicidal rates are hard to break and can be passed 
down for generations.  
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participation in the referendum on the 2012 Constitution against the backdrop 
of the call by opposition forces—who are mostly liberal and secular—to 
boycott the referendum given the Islamist character of the draft and the flawed 
drafting process.328 Polarization may lead to low levels of participation when 
opposition forces are excluded and thus boycott, or when significant sectors of 
the population feel alienated by the tug of war between government and 
opposition and by the nitty-gritty politics.329 In this case, polarization 
contributes to the loss of regime’s legitimacy in eyes of alienated and 
disempowered citizens. 
2. Polarization and Shari’a 
It is the risk of polarization that led Rashid Al-Ghannoushi and his party to 
choose not to insist on a shari’a clause in the Tunisian case.330 Indeed, 
secularist parties joined forces against the Islamists before al-Nahda declared 
officially that it does not seek the inclusion of shari’a in the constitution.331 Its 
decision not to incorporate shari’a in the constitution “aimed at strengthening 
the national consensus and helping the democratic transition to succeed by 
uniting a large majority of the political forces to confront the country’s 
challenges.”332 This decision of course does not in itself end polarization 
because discontent has many sources in post-revolutionary political orders (as 
in the lack of satisfactory change in the economic situation or unaccountable 
security forces).333 And religion’s role does not end by excluding a shari’a 
clause (since religious sentiments can be channeled through state policies or 
legislation or sectarian violence).334 Yet, excluding the shari’a clause sought to 
allay some of the secular fears in the aftermath of the Tunisian elections. Its 
inclusion would have added fuel to the fire. 
 
 328 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 329 Egypt’s Flawed Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at A26 (noting that the low turnout in the 
referendum “reflects disgust with a political process that included violent street protests and a president who, 
for a time, asserted dictatorial powers.”) 
 330 Ben Ahmad, supra note 148. 
 331 AFP, Tunis, Tunisia’s secular opposition unites against Islamists, AL-ARABIYA NEWS, (Mar. 23, 
2012, 6:03 AM) http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/23/202572.html.  
 332 Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at 
[1] (quoting Al-Nahda leader). 
 333 Lyse Doucet, Tunisians’ Frustration, Two Years On, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012, 10:24 AM), http:// 
www.bbc.com/news/world-20663981 (explaining Tunisia’s revolution caused by economic discontent). 
 334 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 231.  
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In Egypt few secular voices demanded the removal of Article 2 from the 
constitution.335 Many secularists signed A petition on February 2011 that 
demanded the separation between state and religion and the return to the 1923 
constitutional provisions that require equality regardless of religious 
affiliation.336 Nevertheless, the main dispute was not whether to have the 
clause, but whether the current clause should be changed to a more Islamist 
phraseology. This state of the dispute is partially a reflection of the 
questionable composition of the Islamist-dominated constitution-making 
committee and the lack of popular participation and public input in the hasty 
drafting process.337 Even within this more limited range of the dispute, Salafi 
calls to drop the word “mabadi” (principles) from Article 2 of the constitution 
(so that “shari’a” itself rather than “principles of shari’a” will be the primary 
source of legislation) led to heated debates in the committee charged with 
drafting the constitution.338 Secular parties and Christian representatives 
opposed this change and threatened to withdraw from the drafting committee if 
the text of Article 2 is amended.339 On the other hand, Salafis threatened in 
their turn to withdraw from the drafting committee if their demands were not 
met.340 On November 9, 2012 thousands of ultra-conservative Islamists 
marched in Cairo demanding the “implementation of shari’a.”341 The final 
draft of the 2012 Constitution left Article 2’s principles of shari’a intact.342 
However, it supplemented it with Article 219 that defined principles of shari’a 
to include more traditional sources of the Islamic law canon.343 By doing so, 
the constitution-makers are ostensibly attempting to limit judicial discretion—
 
 335 Wajdi al-Kumi, Intellectuals Call for Amending the Constitution’s Article 2, AL-YOUM AL-SABE’A 
(Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=354432&SecID=94&IssueID=153 (Arabic). 
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ar/.  
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available at LEXIS, International News. 
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so that, allegedly, judges will have lesser ability to avoid applying shari’a—
given the limited deployment of shari’a by the SCC.344 The mode of 
argumentation and the boundaries of judicial discretion notwithstanding, the 
Islamization of the state apparatus and public sphere through an Article 2-style 
arrangement emboldens radical religious groups in society.345 As the above-
mentioned “implementing shari’a” demonstration shows, populist mobilization 
pressures the state to implement its declared Islamic commitments.346 This 
effect should not be discounted given existing sectarian violence in Egypt in 
which mere rumors ignite violence against Copts and lead to burning their 
churches.347 
This polarization should be avoided given its obvious possible 
destabilization effects on the political and constitutional system. Ruti Teitel has 
observed a similar potential for “political divisiveness” in post-Communist 
European regimes that maintained state support to institutionalized religion.348 
While a shari’a clause does not necessarily in itself create the polarization, it 
becomes a rallying cry around which polarization is manifested and intensified. 
Such polarization makes debates more intractable than they would have been 
otherwise. One reason for this is the possibility of backlash. Even if one 
accepts Hirschl’s “secularization” thesis—that elites delegate religious 
questions to secular judicial institutions to contain Islamization—one needs to 
consider the long-term effect of polarization as such strategies may lead to a 
perception that the religious identity is under attack leading, consequently, 
organized religious forces to react and mobilize.349 As the experience of the 
U.S. Supreme Court shows, judicial intervention (as in progressive rulings like 
Roe v. Wade) may lead to backlash and a rise in the right-wing movement.350 
Additionally, polarization may be more consequential following 
democratization processes than under dictatorships. Polarization prior to the 
Arab Spring was within a repressed political sphere in which a free debate and 
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fair elections were lacking.351 At the time, the state apparatus was not 
necessarily influenced by political polarization because this polarization was 
not reflected in electoral processes and changes in the legislature and 
government. In a post-authoritarian state—with newcomers to the open and 
free political scene and free elections—a polarization in public opinion would 
influence electoral outcomes in ways that may destabilize the governmental 
system. As the risks of polarization become more tangible and likely, the 
management of such a polarization should be through accepted democratic 
ground rules. A shari’a clause rigs these rules in favor of one of the competing 
parties. 
Clearly, polarization cannot be avoided altogether in social and political 
life. As the American abortion debate shows, even long standing constitutional 
democracies are prone to polarized debates that occasionally take a violent 
turn.352 However, it is important that constitutional documents are flexible 
enough to manage this polarization and to alleviate its radical forms, and not to 
be seen by a sizeable portion of the citizenry as part of the problem.353 The 
constitution should provide a unifying framework for resolving these 
controversial issues rather than a divisive instrument. As between the 
possibility of polarization and backlash for having a clause and for not having 
one, it seems to me that the worse backlash possibilities are likely to 
materialize in the case of having a shari’a clause. As the case of Sudan shows, 
making a minority a permanent loser in a majoritarian system that establishes 
religion causes internal strife and may lead to partition.354 
This Article realizes that some may see the possibility of polarization in a 
different direction: that in a country where a large number of people want a 
shari’a clause, polarization and destabilization may result from the failure to 
include a shari’a clause. Yet the possibility of polarization, like other 
prudential arguments, cannot be stripped from both the larger context and 
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normative considerations. On the one hand, despite the virtual consensus 
around Article 2, Egyptian Islamists continued to invoke shari’a to demand its 
application. It is clear then that they were determined to invoke shari’a 
regardless of the existence of the text. The reason might be either because what 
they seek is not merely a textual promise but a full-fledged implementation of 
shari’a as they see it, and/or because they are engaged in what a politician and 
columnist called “an illusory war on shari’a” that masks their true motive of 
maintaining power.355 In either case, polarization would not be the outcome of 
the exclusion of the shari’a clause itself. 
Moreover, if the absence of a shari’a clause will make it impossible 
politically to adopt a constitution then delaying its adoption is a better 
alternative to accepting a bad and highly controversial constitution.356 The 
insistence of the Muslim Brotherhood on introducing a controversial and 
rushed draft to a referendum in December 2012 merely galvanized sectors in 
the Egyptian population who felt excluded from the constitution making 
process and alienated from the religious content included in the draft.357 A 
spokesman for the National Salvation Front—the opposition’s coalition—
explained its decision to boycott the referendum: “The referendum will cause 
further division and polarization and the Front refuses the draft constitution 
which cements presidential oppression and tramples freedoms and liberties.”358 
The lack of a shari’a clause does not seem as detrimental as its existence. 
Polarization may be likely regardless of the existence of a shari’a clause (as in 
Tunisia),359 but the existence of a shari’a clause increases the likelihood and 
intractability of this polarization (as in Egypt).360 The imposition of religious 
rhetoric on political debate makes it less open for rational exchange and 
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resolution because the position with respect to certain proposals is represented 
as illegitimate (because it is “non-Islamic” or “heresy” or “blasphemy”). A 
shari’a clause enables and emboldens such an imposition because it is seen as 
part of the constitutional order, i.e. the highest norms in the country that 
subordinate politics and lawmaking. In this sense, enacting a shari’a clause 
provides an instrument of delegitimization of political opponents. Such 
delegitimization exacerbates polarization.361 
C. Distraction and Fetishism 
A shari’a clause, and its concomitant judicial empowerment given the 
delegation of religious questions to judicial authority, is likely to have four bad 
consequences: distraction effects; anti-participatory resolution of conflicts; 
secular escapism; and constitutional fetishism and legalization. 
1. Distraction 
Polarization goes hand in hand with the reductionism of political discourse 
to a religion-centric debate and the reification of secular and religious identities 
in this discourse. Reductionism and reification feed into polarization, which in 
turn feeds into reductionism and reification in a vicious circle. This state of the 
political discourse conceals disagreements between and within the two camps 
on a host of issues because it becomes the primary visible dividing line in 
society.362 The increasing polarization after January 25, 2011 and leading to 
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June 30, 2013 has shifted quickly the major dispute in Egyptian society and 
politics from one between pro-Mubarak/anti-revolutionary and anti-
Mubarak/revolutionary forces to anti-Muslim Brotherhood (including both 
revolutionary forces and former Mubarak officials and loyalists) and pro-
Muslim Brotherhood.363 
The identities “religious” or “secular” do not necessarily determine one’s 
views on specific social, economic, and political questions. In fact, there might 
be some alliances across the secular-religious dividing line on, for instance, the 
economically conservative-progressive axis. However, the reification of these 
identities (the secular and the religious) in political debates obscures their 
tendency to change and shift overtime, the hybridity of Islamic law,364 and the 
intertwinement of the secular and religious.365 Polarization, then, is grounded 
in a reified and hence mistaken set of categories that misrepresent socio-
political reality and conflict. This reification conceals from participants the 
complex and dynamic reality of these categories and the role of the participants 
themselves in constructing them in particular ways.366 
The debates on the shari’a clause, and on religion in general, in Tunisia and 
Egypt illustrate the danger that the salience of the debate may overshadow and 
distract attention from a myriad of issues like social and economic issues as 
well as other questions of constitutional design concerned with political 
structures and institutions.367 In Tunisia, Al-Nahda prudently prioritized 
institutional design and political stability over shari’a. However the distraction 
potential is still evident given that identity politics—that pits Islamists against 
secularists—distracts from the original goals of the revolution: 
At the socio-economic level, people began to realise that identity pol-
itics does not provide jobs or daily bread. The economics associated 
with it—mainly, in the shape of timid Islamic banking, loans from 
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Muslim countries and Gulf investment—has not really taken off, and 
was soon associated in the mind of a large section of the political 
class with new forms of domination, closely tied to the wider re-
Islamisation project. . . Disheartening unemployment, rising prices 
and pressure for pay adjustments, not to mention compensation of 
martyrs, the wounded and thousands of former political prisoners, are 
far beyond what the economics of identity can handle or disguise. . . 
If there is any meaning to the terms “hijacking” or “stealing” the rev-
olution, this would be it. It consists in displacing the terrain, changing 
the slogans and inventing a narrative. Identity politics and its at-
tendant economics are not commensurate with the revolution and are 
therefore seeds for further unrest and continued protest. The Tunisian 
revolution will fail or succeed depending on how Tunisians will han-
dle this battle and stay on the original grounds of the revolution: 
work, freedom and dignity.368 
Egypt’s case was different since it retained the shari’a clause.369 One 
commentator argued that the debate is politically pointless because neither of 
the extreme sides (Salafis who want a stricter version of the shari’a clause and 
secularists who seek total absence of religion from the constitutional 
document) is likely to get their declared goals given Egypt’s societal 
composition and history.370 But the absence of a shari’a clause from the 
constitution was not really on the table in the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated 
constitution-making committee.371 As I already mentioned, only few marginal 
public voices opposed Article 2.372 Another commentator noted that given the 
abstraction and generality of Article 2 “the real focus should be directed” to the 
institutional questions of “who is empowered to interpret and implement” the 
Article.373 It is these institutional choices that will influence the political stakes 
involved in the shari’a clause. Yet, it is the debate over the shari’a clause that 
overshadows these very questions. This point is illustrated in the debate over 
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the referendum on the constitutional amendments on March 2011.374 Some 
Islamists used the shari’a clause to add a religious rhetoric to advance goals 
that are not related to Article 2. As commentators note, the “imposition of 
Article 2 on the debate was for the most part the handiwork of the Salafist 
movement,” even though these amendments did not relate to Article 2 and 
focused on “presidential elections and president’s term of office.”375 
Egyptian academic-turn-politician and columnist Amr Hamzawy noted in 
June 2011 that sectors of the Egyptian population were concerned that political 
discourse is reduced to the questions of religion and politics. Expressing his 
agreement with this concern he wrote: 
Indeed, there are issues that our political debate does not address in 
an organized manner like social justice and its relation to the market 
economy and the particular suggested tools to establish a just society. 
Also, there is the issue of rebuilding the centralized Egyptian state 
structure, which is unsuitable for democratic transition, and pushing 
it towards adopting the principle of elections rather than appointment 
for public posts, and then a culture of accountability, oversight, and 
supervision. And this is connected to de-centralization which is a 
necessary path for just distribution of powers and expertise between 
the center in Cairo and the governorates and localities. Issues like 
these are virtually absent from political debate despite its extreme 
importance . . . .376 
For Hamzawy, discussing issues like these is more fruitful than “complete 
exhaustion of energy in a reiterative discussion about religion and politics” that 
merely reproduces an already clear dispute “between Islamists and liberals, 
regarding the constitution and elections.”377 A month earlier, Hamzawy 
criticized sectarian violence and Islamist rhetoric on implementing shari’a, not 
only because they exclude and harm Christians, but also because the media 
attention they attract pushes away serious engagement with pressing economic 
and security concerns.378 Another Egyptian commentator lamented the lack of 
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the “calm and objective discussion” concerning the draft of December 2012 
Constitution: “In the past weeks the subject of shari’a and identity has 
occupied the central position” leading to a receding “attention to the nature of 
any democratic constitution” in terms of institutions and checks and 
balances.379 
These examples of distraction are lamentable, because this distraction has 
bad consequences for the marginalized issues. This is not to say that Egyptians 
did not discuss questions of constitutional design other than the shari’a clause. 
However, a shari’a clause debate—being a crucial part of identity politics—
either frames the general debate by sidelining these issues and hence offering 
them less spotlight for a healthy discussion, or frames the issues themselves in 
a misleading way by effectively hindering a serious engagement with them, 
even when they are admitted to the general debate. Consequently, “framing 
effects . . . shape what people see as pertinent alternatives . . . what they 
actually focus on when making a particular decision.”380 The entanglement of 
some of these issues with the shari’a clause and its religious overtones makes 
the debate over them unnecessarily complicated and more intractable than it 
should be. 
Indeed, the lack of serious discussion on questions like social justice had a 
substantive impact on the issues themselves. As a former constituent assembly 
member and columnist, Ziad Bahaa al-Dein381 points out, that although “social 
justice” occasionally appeared in political parties’ programs in the post-
revolutionary period it was too generic and ambiguous.382 Thus, it lacked clear 
and programmatic content beyond demanding minimal wage and progressive 
taxation.383 Without such content, claims Bahaa al-Dein, it becomes an empty 
slogan for populist consumption.384 For instance, political parties that claimed 
to support social justice also supported the market economy and did not 
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explain the relationship between these two agendas.385 This lack of 
specification blurs the lines between different parties, since their agendas 
sound similar.386 Furthermore, Bahaa al-Dein argues that social justice is 
impossible in a society that generally lacks a justice based on equal citizenship 
rights.387 Indeed, the lack of equality, as our discussion in Part II.A above 
shows, may be detrimental to a just distribution of resources between citizens, 
because those are not considered equal in the first place.388 
The literature on religion, income, and voting suggests another possible 
effect of distraction. Scholars suggest that voters may vote against their 
economic and distributive interests given their religiosity.389 In this sense, 
voters may prioritize public religious concerns over the policies that are more 
likely to benefit them, because they do not perceive left-to-center parties as 
committed to these religious and conservative values.390 Scholars make these 
observations even with respect to Western states that do not incorporate 
religion in the constitution.391 Thus, it can apply to Egypt’s case even when the 
shari’a clause is absent. Nevertheless, if this literature is correct, and my 
argument above that a shari’a clause—and its concomitant identity politics—
leads to polarization and dominance of religious questions is also correct, then 
a dominant public debate over a visible and high-profile constitutional article 
may contribute to pushing voters in the said direction even further.392 
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2. Anti-participatory Arrangement 
Delegating religious questions to a judicial authority is an anti-participatory 
move, because it transfers the power of decision-making from the hands of the 
many to the hands of the few. These issues are fundamental questions of 
collective concern, and influence everyone’s lives in the polity. Thus, they 
need to be the object not only of public deliberation, but also of collective 
decision-making against the background of a fair and acceptable conflict 
resolution mechanism that the constitution institutionalizes. The anti-
majoritarian role of a shari’a clause cannot be defended by pointing out the 
existence of many institutions in democracies that do not resort to majoritarian 
decision-making, such as American executive administrative agencies.393 First, 
such institutions are arguably technocratic and professional in ways that cannot 
be claimed when secular judges are interpreting shari’a: Shari’a is not as 
‘technical’ as inflation rates, and state judges normally have no special 
expertise in religious law.394 Second, even these technical institutions can be 
subject to democratization calls (as in attempts to include public participation 
in bureaucratic processes of decision making).395 
3. Secular Escapism 
Judicial empowerment is an escapist tactic used by secular elites who are 
unable and/or unwilling to make the necessary political effort to advance their 
ideas through, inter alia, developing, detailing, and implementing the socio-
economic programs that make the societal conditions more receptive to secular 
and liberal ideas.396 While the secularization thesis—that tied the decline of the 
religiosity to modernization and rationalization processes—has been under 
attack,397 evidence indicates that “the importance of religiosity persists most 
strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer 
nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks.”398 In addition, Islamic 
religious movements have been extensively involved in the social conditions of 
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communities and their welfare.399 Non-religious or secular parties are rarely 
similarly involved, and are reduced to seasonal contact with their 
constituencies in electoral campaigns.400 These secular parties lack, in general, 
a commitment to an agenda of distributive justice.401 The abovementioned thin 
and populist use of the slogan of social justice is an indication of this lack of 
serious commitment to it by secular and liberal parties. This lack of 
commitment explains, in part, and feeds into the abovementioned reductionism 
of political discourse to religious questions. 
4. Constitutional Fetishism and Legalization 
The focus on the shari’a clause in Egypt is symptomatic to the larger 
phenomenon of fetishism of constitutionalism. Many actors’ actions in the 
post-revolutionary Egyptian politics portrayed this fetishism. The revolution’s 
main aims and grievances were state practices and did not include the question 
of the constitutional text, as Ahdaf Soueif reminds us.402 Yet, the constitutional 
text became a central question. In a rare instance of an army (as opposed to a 
constituent assembly or the people) issuing a constitution,403 the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (“SCAF”) issued “constitutional declarations” or 
“amendments” (March 15, 2011; March 30, 2011; and June 2011), only one of 
which was subject to a referendum (March 19, 2011).404 The March 30 
amendments—after the referendum—incorporated verbatim many of the 1971 
constitutional provisions, including Article 2 (as amended in 1980).405 SCAF 
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further amended the declaration in June 2011,406 without seeking popular 
approval of the changes.407 
In June 2011, forty-one parties endorsed a petition demanding “The 
Constitution First” with millions of signatories.408 Some actors understood this 
campaign as an attempt to preempt the possibility of an Islamist rise to power 
after an election and to bypass the SCAF amendments.409 Upon assuming 
power, President Mohammad Morsi followed SCAF’s example and issued his 
own self-declared “constitutional declarations.”410 His November 22, 2012, 
declaration sought to immunize his presidential decrees and declarations from 
judicial power411, immunized the two houses of parliament from judicial 
dissolution (Article V), and amended the March 30, 2011, SCAF amendments 
by extending the constitution making period (Article IV).412 Given public 
criticism and street violence, President Morsi had to partially rescind this 
declaration by issuing another “constitutional declaration.”413 The opposition 
to Morsi’s declaration was substantive, but virtually no one pondered upon the 
questionable process in which a party—the president—issues a 
“constitutional” document, when it is not clearly authorized to do so, 
“amending” a “constitutional” document that another party—the military—
issued, when, again, it is not self-evidently authorized to issue such a supra-
political document. Verbal utterances, then, sought to grant these declarations 
more power than they have, but in reality, they were just political decisions 
dressed up as supra-political decisions. The goal was to conceal the political 
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nature of these decisions and simultaneously utilize them in an ongoing 
political struggle. Here, like in the American context, “the use of constitutional 
rhetoric simply masks political preferences.”414 This masking may allow 
“politicians to evade responsibility for their actions.”415 The fact that President 
Morsi had to rescind his “constitutional declaration” showed that the attempt to 
immunize political preferences through such rhetoric has to face the reality of 
politics. It is mistaken, then, to consider Egypt’s crisis—as many did—as a 
“constitutional crisis” rather than a political crisis.416 But this mistake is rooted 
partially in the self-description of these declarations. 
This misconceived overemphasis on—and attempt to hide behind—the 
constitution has bad effects. As Louis Michael Seidman warns in the American 
context: 
Our obsession with the [U.S.] Constitution has saddled us with a dys-
functional political system, kept us from debating the merits of divi-
sive issues and inflamed our public discourse . . . What has preserved 
our political stability is not a poetic piece of parchment, but en-
trenched institutions and habits of thought and, most important, the 
sense that we are one nation and must work out our differences.417 
As for the shari’a clause itself, judicial empowerment leads to legalization of 
essentially political issues, rendering the status quo more natural and just than 
it actually is.418 This transfers political questions that are already publicly 
discussed to a seemingly apolitical body with the power to have the final word. 
One may think that legalizing these questions prevents an overt moral war. 
However, this legalization neither resolves them nor reduces their 
intractability. Addressing them as purely legal questions is a misleading 
attempt to defuse their political nature and present their resolution as neutral. 
The legalization of these political questions introduces legal technicalities that 
are not congenial to a thorough discussion.419 Ultimately, this legalization fails 
to de-politicize questions of religion and state, because the gaps, ambiguities, 
and contradictions in constitutional and legal provisions invite judicial 
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policymaking that is influenced by and contributes to political and ideological 
debates.420 It may even politicize the constitutional court by making it an 
object of power struggle between different political actors that are trying to tip 
the interpretive scales to their favor through packing the court with their 
preferred judges. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article addressed the question of the introduction of a shari’a clause 
into the constitutions of emerging democracies in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. It addressed the normative and prudential arguments supporting 
Islamic constitutionalism, trying to cast these arguments in their best light. 
Tackling the assumptions that undergird these arguments, this Article argued 
that they eventually fail. Islamic constitutionalism was rejected through 
normative and prudential reasons. Ultimately, the Article urged a turn from a 
heavily conceptualist debate to a pragmatic examination. Only through a 
proper contextualization of the question and a thorough assessment of the 
consequences of conceptual systems and constitutional arrangements can we 
approximate an answer. Deploying such examination, the religious clause was 
read against the backdrop of Egyptian and Tunisian political and constitutional 
processes. Accordingly, the Article argued that the constitution makers in 
Egypt and Tunisia are better advised not to include such a clause given its 
assessment of the stakes involved and the likely implications. 
This argument may seem politically unfeasible. That, however, would be a 
quick conclusion. To begin with, judgments concerning feasibility or 
practicality or realism are not merely factual judgments devoid of normative 
judgments and goals. The Article contested the facts that underlie the realist 
argument either by presenting new facts or by showing how these facts 
necessitate a normative judgment regarding how one arrives at these facts (e.g., 
how we should measure popular will). If the realist concedes that a shari’a 
clause is not an ideal arrangement, then there is a need to identify a desirable 
alternative arrangement. Once this goal is identified, it can become a regulative 
idea towards which political action can be oriented. The answer cannot be: 
“[A]ccept the existing bad arrangement and hope it will change in the future” 
because, as previously indicated, choices made at the present influence the 
availability of options in the future. If one disagrees normatively with a shari’a 
clause then one undermines her own position, at least over the long-term, when 
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she agrees to it under the banner of realpolitik. Ultimately, this realpolitik is no 
more than an apology to the status quo. 
As the Tunisian example shows, it is quite realistic to expect at least some 
of the processes of post-Arab Spring constitution making to result in a 
constitution that is free of a shari’a clause. Admittedly, in Egypt, the political 
reality seems more intractable and volatile, but it would be a mistake to take 
this option off the constitutional table. At a time of constitution making, 
constituent assemblies should address all the fundamental questions in the 
polity in order to lay down the foundations for a fair and stable political-legal 
order. It is unfortunate that at the time Salafis demanded a stricter version of 
the shari’a clause in Egypt, there was virtually no debate on the prudence of 
having a shari’a clause in the first place.421 But as I indicated, this should be 
understood as part of—and contributing to—larger processes like polarization 
and constitutional fetishism. 
It should be clear, however, that this Article does not consider the 
arguments it offers as less contestable or indeterminate than the arguments it 
rejects. Unlike the conceptualist arguments, the arguments offered here do not 
seek a closure of the debate. This Article proposes them as a reasonable 
assessment of historical conditions, given a knowledge of the past and a hope 
for the future. Unlike the move to abstraction—which seeks to avoid 
disagreement on the ground level by seeking agreement on the abstract 
level422—here, the attempt is to recognize disagreement at all levels. Given the 
inescapable fact of disagreement, there is a need to advance a more concrete 
case-by-case examination of the relevant issues given all the circumstances. 
Disagreement on the ground level is more enlightening than disagreement on 
the abstract conceptual level, because it is grounded in actual consequences. 
This nuanced focus seeks to: (1) avoid the generalizing tendency of conceptual 
debates; (2) evade the unwarranted optimism of the normative argument; and 
(3) reject the realist argument’s despondency and uncritical acceptance of 
reality. 
This contextualization does not imply that one should circumvent a 
principled position. Quite the contrary, this contextualization is performed 
against the backdrop of normative principles. Clearly, the arguments in this 
Article would effectively contribute to the outcomes desired by the liberal 
secularist camp. However, the arguments advanced here make no claims that 
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Islam and democracy are a priori incompatible (or that they are a priori 
compatible, for that matter). Nor do they preach modernization, because the 
distinction between traditional and modern societies on which this outlook 
relies is a myopic simplification of reality. 
Prior to the Arab Spring, the choice may have seemed limited to secular 
dictators and Islamic democrats.423 In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
however, there is no reason to maintain this binary choice: scholars and Arab 
constitution makers should be able to imagine a political regime that is neither 
non-democratic, nor religious. Constitution makers, who may still feel 
uncertain and are reluctant to overcome this binary choice, are advised to 
consult Max Weber.424 Weber posits an irreconcilable conflict between the 
“ethics of ultimate ends”—according to which, the judgment concerning the 
rightness of conduct is decoupled from its possible consequences—and the 
“ethics of responsibility”—according to which, the rightness of actions is 
judged by their potential consequences.425 As politics requires the deployment 
of coercive state power, including through law, the application of our 
convictions and principles requires attention to the consequences given our 
judgment of the situation. For Weber, a politician must be capable of making 
hard choices between contradictory ethical demands and taking responsibility 
for their consequences, even the unforeseen ones.426 The ethics of ultimate 
ends avoids making these hard choices and taking this responsibility, given its 
occupation with rightness of conduct, moral purity, or the salvation of the 
soul.427 Weber’s “situated consequentialism”—as opposed to utilitarianism—
posits that “causal sequences and outcomes are intelligible to us only from 
horizons of meaning that are themselves constructed from the vantage point of 
our ultimate practical values.”428 
This Article mentions Weber here for three reasons. First, the notion of 
responsibility is important, because—as the Article shows—the effect of 
different arrangements and choices is to avoid responsibility. Distraction from 
fundamental questions evades taking political responsibility for these 
questions.429 Secular escapism neglects political responsibility.430 
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Constitutional fetishism allows running away from political responsibility.431 
Legalization and delegation of questions of religion to judges permits avoiding 
political responsibility.432 This evasion of responsibility at various levels is 
connected to the question of Islamic constitutionalism: that the identity politics 
that focus on constitutionalizing shari’a leads to distraction; that judicial 
empowerment through a shari’a clause is an escapist secular tactic; that the 
preoccupation with a shari’a clause is part of constitutional fetishism; and that 
legalization of religious issues throws the ball from the political arena to the 
legal arena. Accordingly, the constitutionalization of shari’a hinders 
acknowledgment of political responsibility. 
Second, Weber’s situated consequentialism may not necessarily dictate the 
result this Article advocates, because judgments of consequences and 
situations differ.433 However, this Article attempts to provoke a conversation 
along these lines by providing constitution makers with an analysis of the 
consequences of the available constitutional arrangements in Egypt and 
Tunisia. The arguments provided here against Islamic constitutionalism show 
that there is a choice, because this institutional configuration is not a 
predetermined fate. They also show that on balance the consequences of 
excluding shari’a are preferable, and it is this choice that constitution makers 
should take responsibility for. 
Third, Weber’s situated consequentialism should be understood against the 
backdrop of value pluralism, i.e. the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable 
value conflict.434 This conflict cannot be resolved by value monism, i.e. by 
positing a superseding meta-value or super-principle, or through a harmonious 
conceptual marriage of the competing values (as in “constitutional democracy” 
or “Islamic constitutionalism”).435 The recognition of the paradoxical existence 
of constitutionalism and democracy or Islam and democracy and hence the 
futility of the illusory stability under the hands of a priori conceptualism 
should lead to the continuous openness of the negotiation between the ethical 
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and political.436 This pragmatic vantage point provides us with a more accurate 
reading of modern-day politics that is not consensus-driven but antagonistic. It 
also emphasizes practice and experience, as opposed to the focus on the 
argumentative modes and rational resolution of conceptual and moral conflicts 
that excludes the role of the passions.437 The recognition of value pluralism 
may lead from political “antagonism,” in which opponents treat each other as 
enemies, to “agonistic pluralism” in which politics is adversarial.438 
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